James Madison University

JMU Scholarly Commons
Masters Theses

The Graduate School

Spring 2013

System dynamics modeling study of the possibility
of endemic measles in the state of Virginia
Ivan W. Gowe
James Madison University

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/master201019
Part of the Medicine and Health Sciences Commons
Recommended Citation
Gowe, Ivan W., "System dynamics modeling study of the possibility of endemic measles in the state of Virginia" (2013). Masters Theses.
224.
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/master201019/224

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the The Graduate School at JMU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact dc_admin@jmu.edu.

SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODELING STUDY OF THE POSSIBILITY OF ENDEMIC
MEASLES IN THE STATE OF VIRGINIA
Ivan W Gowe

A thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty of
JAMES MADISON UNIVERSITY
In
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the degree of
Master of Science

Department of Integrated Science and Technology

May 2013

Dedication
To my friends who are making an effort to balance personal freedoms with public health
in their children’s lives.

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my family and friends for their support.
I would also like to thank my thesis committee Dr. Michael Deaton, Dr. Amanda
Biesecker and Dr. Kristi Lewis for availing their expertise, Dr. Patty Hale for allowing me to
study with her nursing students to prepare for this study and Dr. Ivory for her assistance.
I am grateful to my Virginia Department of Health experts, Jonathan Falk and Kim
Whetzel and Dr. Carla Black at the CDC Immunization Services Division for innumerable and
invaluable consultations.

ii

Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Background ........................................................................................................ 1
Epidemiological Study of Measles….………………………………………….… 2
Surveillance …………………………………………………………………....… 10
Measles Vaccine ……………………………………………………………….… 13
Virginia Cases ……………………………………………………………….…… 20
Social Impact …………………………………………………….......................... 21
System Dynamics Methodology …………………………………………….…… 23
Chapter 2: SEIR-Aging chain Measles Model ..................................................................... 28
Model Purpose ………………………………………………………………….... 28
Model Terminology….. ……………………………………………..…….…...… 29
SEIR Backbone …………………………………………..………..………....…... 30
Model age cohorts ………………………………………..…………........……..... 34
Model Output ……………………………………..…............................................ 37
Interface ……………………………………..…………………….………..…..... 38
Chapter 3: Model Testing .................................................................................................... 40
Model Testing …………………………………….………..…………………...... 40
Chapter 4: Analysis .............................................................................................................. 43
Run Parameters and Values………………………………………….……….…... 43
Experimental Scenarios ……………………………………….............................. 43
Baseline……………………………………………………………………....….... 43
Threshold testing runs……………………………………………………...…..…. 44
Interpretation ……………………………………………………………….......… 48
Implications ……………………………………………………………….…...… 50
Further research recommendations …………………………………………...….. 52
Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………...... 53

iii

Appendix A: Measles case investigation and case classification flowchart......................... 54
Appendix B: Vaccine Safety Surveillance systems …………………………………........ 55
Appendix C: Summary of Institute of Medicine findings on Measles vaccine and MMR... 56
Appendix D: MACSEIR Model equations........................................................................... 58
References ………………………………………………………………............................ 65

iv

List of Tables
Table 1 .............................................................................................................................. 43
Table 2 .............................................................................................................................. 45
Table 3 .............................................................................................................................. 45
Table 4 .............................................................................................................................. 48

v

List of Figures
Figure 1: Immune response and measles pathogenesis.. .................................................................. 8
Figure 2: Measles surveillance in the US....................................................................................... 12
Figure 3: US vaccination trends.. ................................................................................................... 15
Figure 4: Evolution of Immunization Programs and Prominence of Vaccine Safety.. .................. 17
Figure 5: A balancing feedback loop describing changing perception of vaccination risk with
disease incidence and the subsequent effect on vaccination rate. ..................................... 18
Figure 6: Event oriented and system oriented world views. .......................................................... 23
Figure 7: Age cohorts..................................................................................................................... 29
Figure 8: Modeling icons and terms .............................................................................................. 29
Figure 9: Basic SEIR structure ...................................................................................................... 30
Figure 10: Extended SEIR structure .............................................................................................. 31
Figure 11: Full MACSEIR structure .............................................................................................. 32
Figure 12: Stock and flow structure of the Pre School sector ........................................................ 35
Figure 13: Stock and flow structure of the School age cohort ....................................................... 36
Figure 14: MACSEIR Interface ..................................................................................................... 39
Figure 15: Accumulation of fractional infectious population. ....................................................... 41
Figure 16: Index case in an unimmunized population. Run time = 120 days. ............................... 42
Figure 17: Population fractions with increasing vaccination rate .................................................. 44
Figure 18: Length of outbreak for static vaccination rate .............................................................. 46
Figure 20: Peak infected for static vaccination rate ....................................................................... 47
Figure 19: Time between secondary outbreaks for static vaccination rate .................................... 47
Figure 21: Population fractions with decreasing vaccination rate ................................................. 48

vi

Abstract
After an effective vaccine was widely available, measles incidence fell by 98%.
Immunization programs and surveillance systems in the United States (US) are so successful
there has been no endemic spread since 2000. The threat from measles lies in its high infectivity,
an asymptomatic infectious state that lasts an average of four days and the decreasing popularity
of vaccination. The lack of first-hand experience with the infection (due to immunization) has
caused some to wonder if the vaccine is necessary. Herd immunity threshold is a measure of the
fraction of immune individuals present in a population to keep disease reproduction rate below
one. This threshold varies with population and disease characteristics. While below herd
immunity threshold an index case could cause a small outbreak. In contrast, a gradual decrease in
vaccination rates (or an increase in exemption rates) above herd immunity threshold coupled with
an index case can lead to an epidemic. Endemic state is attained if the chain of infection persists
for greater than one calendar year. Such a return to endemic state as has been seen in the United
Kingdom. This study uses System Dynamics methodology to create a Measles Aging Chain
Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Recovered model (named MACSEIR) to analyze the vaccination
conditions under which outbreaks and possibly endemic spread of measles could occur in the
state of Virginia. The model utilizes a fictional population with demographic characteristics taken
from US census data in addition to epidemiologic data from the Virginia Department of Health
and Centers for Disease Prevention and Control (CDC). Outbreaks have been simulated under
varying vaccination conditions. The study shows that outbreaks will occur in any vaccination rate
conditions while greater than 4% of the population is susceptible to measles. While measles
incidence is infrequent in the US, healthcare providers should still maintain a high level of
suspicion in differential diagnosis because it is endemic in many countries that American families
frequent. Though national vaccination rates are still high, some community rates are not; they
should be the focus of prevention efforts.
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CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND
Prior to 1963 there were an estimated 4 million annual cases of measles in the United
States. Since then a safe, effective vaccine has been available across the globe so measles infects
and kills less people. Incidence fell by 98% after the vaccine was introduced (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, 2012b; Strebel, Papania, & Halsey, 2004). The evidence of the success of
this program is that the United States (US) has not had an endemic case of measles since 2000
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012a)1. The resounding success of the measles
vaccine program is evidenced by a seeming absence of a measles threat. In response people have
become complacent concerning the risk of measles infection; seeing more vaccine adverse events
than actual measles infections, there is a likely growing population of unvaccinated people who
have exercised their right to refuse vaccination and by so doing put other members of the public
at risk (Bedford, 2011; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2011b, 2012a; Henderson,
Dunston, Fedson, & et al., 1991).
There were 222 reported measles cases in the US in 2011 compared to a median of 60
reported cases per annum between 2001 and 2010. Dr. Schuchat, the Director of the National
Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases at the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) cited several probable reasons for this increase, and warned against the
assumption that there is no threat from this disease (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
2012a). There were seven measles cases in Virginia during 2011. As is common with the vast
majority of cases occurring since elimination of endemic measles in the US, the index cases
(four) were imported (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012c). In light of this a
question arises; is it possible for a sustained chain of measles infections in Virginia? Whatever

1

The date of measles elimination in the US is either 1993 (Gershon, 2010; Strebel et al., 2004), 1994 (Rota,
Rota, Redd, Papania, & Bellini, 2004), 2000 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012a) or 2002
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012b).
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the answer is, it would be prudent to have an idea of the conditions under which this might be
possible, to assess the effect of vaccine exemptions on measles clusters in the state. The goal of
this thesis is to use available epidemiologic and immunization data to populate an aging chaindisease system dynamics simulation model to explore these questions under different vaccination
rate trend assumptions. This chapter gives an overview of measles.
Epidemiological Study of Measles
Public health significance
Measles is a highly contagious disease recorded in human history dating back to the 7th
century. It was distinguished from smallpox in the 10th century, and was considered the worse of
the two. After variolation proved effective against smallpox, and most physicians considered the
two diseases related, it was unsuccessfully attempted with measles. Enders and Peebles isolated
the virus in human and monkey kidney cultures in 1961, and after successful transfer to egg
embryos work began on a vaccine that was licensed in 1963 (Strebel et al., 2004). This vaccine
has enabled some control over a widespread, once devastating disease. Global vaccination
programs, improved healthcare, nutrition and education have drastically reduced measles
incidence and deaths. In 2008, 164,000 children died of measles worldwide compared to 2.6
million in 1980 (Seward & Orenstein, 2012). The success of vaccine programs in the US has led
to the elimination of endemic measles (Harpaz, Papania, McCauley, & Redd, 2004; Rota et al.,
2004; Seward & Orenstein, 2012). In spite of such resounding successes, measles is still a
significant infection, and has the highest mortality among vaccine preventable illnesses (M. B.
Oldstone, 2000; Strebel et al., 2004). Measles is a public health concern because:
It is highly communicable – by airborne transmission infectious particles, once
aerosolized can be suspended in air for up to two hours and patients are contagious for an average
of four days without symptoms (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012b; Heffernan &
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Keeling, 2008). These characteristics increase the chance that the measles virus (MV) will infect
susceptible individuals, even though they may be few and far between (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, 2012a; Strebel et al., 2004).


It is easily spread in our highly mobile society - frequent and rapid global travel
coupled with pockets of unvaccinated people are increasing measles incidence in the
US as the disease is imported from endemic regions and spread to non-vaccinated
contacts (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012a; Harpaz et al., 2004;
Rota et al., 2004).



Immunization rates are decreasing – religious and philosophical vaccine exemptions
are legal in the US and parents are taking them for fear of vaccine related conditions
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012a; Remley, 2011; Schwartz, 2012),
state and medical community interference with parental autonomy (Schwartz, 2012),
and at times because it is more convenient (Britten, 2009). If exempt children never
get vaccinated or infected over time the population at risk will include more and
more adults who tend to experience more severe infections than children. This could
result in widespread atypical measles.



MV infection suppresses the immune system – MV patients are at risk of
opportunistic infections and resurgence of dormant infections such as latent
tuberculosis (TB) or varicella zoster virus infections (shingles). An endemic measles
state would likely increase incidence of secondary infections like pneumonia,
encephalitis and the aforementioned TB to name a few (Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, 2012b; Strebel et al., 2004).



HIV and other immune compromising conditions complicate vaccination of children
– patients with immune compromised conditions whose onset was before measles
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vaccination lose immunity and are at higher risk for atypical infection, misdiagnosis
and complications (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012a; Helfand,
Moss, Harpaz, Scott, & Cutts, 2005; Scott, Moss, Gilani, & Low, 2011).


Outbreak control is expensive – estimates of outbreak costs range from $18, 000 (one
case) to $400 million (multiple year outbreak) (Coleman et al., 2012; Takahashi,
Ohkusa, & Kim, 2011).
Population at risk

Measles is a childhood disease affecting all children across the globe. It gains the
designation ‘childhood disease’ because by 12-15 years of age, 90% of children in a pre-vaccine
population would have had measles, with the highest incidence rate in the 5-9 year old population
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012b; Strebel et al., 2004). In 2011, the median
measles patient was 14 years old and 61% of patients were younger than 19 years (McLean,
2012). Recovered patients gain lifelong resistance to subsequent infection, but uninfected and
unvaccinated persons are at lifelong risk. In addition, adult onset measles is more severe and has
higher mortality rate (Strebel et al., 2004).
Immune compromised persons are at higher risk of measles infection. Studies show
persistence of humoral immunity in patients who were immunized first and became immune
compromised later. Cell mediated immune compromise however, places patients at risk despite
vaccination. This includes post-transplant, congenital immune compromised patients and those
compromised secondary to cancer or high dose steroids (Gershon, 2010; Strebel et al., 2004).
Etiology
MV is a spherical, paramyxovirus, of the genus Morbillivirus. It is an enveloped, single
stranded, negative sense RNA virus. Its genome codes for at least eight structural proteins. There
are two types of MV, wild MV and vaccine (Edmonston strain) type MV distinguishable by
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genetic sequencing (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012b; Gershon, 2010; Strebel
et al., 2004). There are altogether 22 measles genotypes in seven classes which have similar
antigens causing the same infection (Gershon, 2010; Harpaz et al., 2004; Rota et al., 2004). MV
has two primary antigens in its envelope proteins, an H-glycoprotein which attaches to host cells
by hemagglutination; and an F-glycoprotein which lyses cells and thus propagates the virus after
infection (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012b; Gershon, 2010).
Transmission
MV is sensitive to strong light, drying, acid and proteolytic enzymes. It is however,
capable of being suspended in air droplets for up to two hours, especially in relatively dry air.
This accounts for its airborne or droplet transmission and the majority of outbreaks occurring in
winter months in endemic regions (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012b; Gershon,
2010; Strebel et al., 2004). Before the MV vaccine and in measles endemic regions, there are 3-4
month long epidemics every 2-5 years in addition to annual, seasonal epidemics (Gershon, 2010;
Moss & Griffin, 2012; World Health Organization, 2009), with attack rates as high as 99% (M.
Oldstone, 2000). Once infected, a patient is infectious for about seven days. Of those, three to
five days are asymptomatic (Heffernan & Keeling, 2008). This is a problem because during that
time people go about their daily activities and spread the disease. This partly accounts for
measles’ rampant spread, the difficulty of outbreak control and surveillance in under vaccinated
populations.
Vaccine and lab MV strains are pathogenic in primates because they carry the CD46
complement regulatory protein which is a primary MV receptor (Gershon, 2010), but it has no
animal reservoir because wild MV cannot use CD46 (Noyce & Richardson, 2012). Pathogenesis
studies are carried out in monkeys because they have been shown to suffer a mild infection from
the vaccine and lab stains (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012b; Gershon, 2010;
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Strebel et al., 2004). The absence of an animal reservoir makes it a good candidate for global
eradication.
Natural History and Pathophysiology
After MV is inhaled, it infects the respiratory epithelial cells. The epithelial cell receptor
is Nectin 4/Poliovirus receptor-like protein 4 (PVRL4), a protein that is part of the adherens
junction structure (Gershon, 2010; Heffernan & Keeling, 2008; Noyce & Richardson, 2012). Its
H-glycoprotein attaches the virus to CD46 complement regulating protein (only in vaccine and
lab strains), and/or CD150 signaling lymph activation molecules (SLAMs) on regional lymphoid
cells in the upper respiratory tract. SLAMs are thought to activate lymphocytes and control
cytokine release (Gershon, 2010; Strebel et al., 2004) thus the virus begins by suppressing the
host immune system response. MV replicates for 2-3 days then F-glycoprotein lyses respiratory
epithelial and lymphoid cells; this is the primary viremia (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2012b; Heffernan & Keeling, 2008; Strebel et al., 2004). There are particularly high
viral loads in monocytes, B and T lymphocytes (Heffernan & Keeling, 2008). When these cells
are lysed, they can be anywhere in the body, so it becomes a systemic infection. The virus
attaches and replicates in distal reticuloendothelial sites, again favoring mononuclear white blood
cells (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012b; Heffernan & Keeling, 2008) which
usually make up about 50% of white blood cells.
There is a second viremia 5-7 days post-infection which infects the thymus, spleen,
lymph nodes, liver, skin, conjunctiva, intestines, bladder and lungs. The virus continues to
replicate in the epithelial cells of these organs (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
2012b; Gershon, 2010; Heffernan & Keeling, 2008). The spread of the virus both activates and
cripples the immune system making the patient susceptible to opportunistic infections and the
resurgence of dormant infections like tuberculosis thus increasing the risk of complications (M.
B. Oldstone, 2000; Strebel et al., 2004).
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About three days after the second viremia, infectiousness begins as viral particles are
shed from the respiratory epithelium. This marks the earliest point symptoms could occur, and the
end of the 10-14 day incubation period (Figure 1). The prodrome is marked by malaise, anorexia,
fever that increases in a stepwise fashion going as high as 103° F, respiratory symptoms (cough,
coryza), and Koplik’s spots (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012b). The patient is
most infectious during this period when the viral count peaks (Figure 1). The measles rash
appears between days 14 and 17. Some authors (Gershon, 2010) say the rash coincides with the
end of infectiousness, others (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012b; Heffernan &
Keeling, 2008) say the patient may be infectious for another 2-4 days after rash onset. The rash
itself is composed of red, flat, confluent specks that look like grains of sand on the patient’s skin.
The rash covers the skin, starting at the hairline progressing downwards to the toes (Gershon,
2010). Koplik’s spots are blue-grey specks on a red base occurring on the patient’s oral mucosa
and are pathognomic for measles (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012b; Gershon,
2010). Cellular hypersensitivity response immune complexes and giant MV infected skin cells
form the characteristic spots and the rash (Gershon, 2010; Heffernan & Keeling, 2008). Patients
with deficient cellular immunity do not develop the rash. About five days after rash onset, it
disappears as it came, starting at the face going down to the toes; the symptoms subside about two
days after rash onset (Gershon, 2010).

8

Figure 1: Immune response and measles pathogenesis. This figure shows the progression of viral load and
corresponding immune response to a measles infection (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012b;
Heffernan & Keeling, 2008).

Treatment
There is no treatment for measles; combinations of interferon, ribavirin and
immunoglobulin (IG) with high doses of Vitamin A have been shown to reduce morbidity and
mortality by aiding the body’s immune response (Strebel et al., 2004). Vitamin A deficiency was
associated (by observation alone) with increased mortality; in response the World Health
Organization (WHO) recommended vitamin supplement with treatment (and vaccine) especially
in malnourished patients (Benn, 2012). Other treatments in addition to this are in response to
complications. Unless there is a secondary bacterial infection antibiotics are neither useful nor
necessary (Strebel et al., 2004).
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Complications
Immune response to measles concurrently hampers response to other pathogens for
weeks and even months after recovery. This makes patients highly susceptible to new and latent
opportunistic infections (Moss & Griffin, 2012). Thirty to forty percent of all measles cases have
complications (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012b; Moss & Griffin, 2012) due to
the systemic nature of the infection and depression of the immune system. Complications are
more common among children under five years of age and adults over 20 years of age (Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012b). The most frequently reported complications are
diarrhea, otitis media, pneumonia, encephalitis, seizures and death. Pneumonia can be due to viral
or bacterial super-infection, a state in which a patient has two or more infectious processes
concurrently. The death rate is about 0.2%, most of those from secondary pneumonia (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, 2012b; Strebel et al., 2004).
In addition to encephalitis as a secondary infection, sub-acute sclerosing panencephalitis
(SSPE) is a post-infection complication that can occur. It is a chronic degenerative, probably
autoimmune, fatal neurologic illness that occurs in some patients 6-15 years after recovery from a
MV infection occurring after two years of age. Incidence of SSPE has decreased since the
vaccine; it is clearly not a response to the vaccine (Gershon, 2010; Gutierrez, Issacson, & Koppel,
2010). SSPE is thought to be caused by a persistent infection by a mutant MV to which the body
responds as it would to wild-type measles causing an increase in MV antibody titers which do
little against the actual causative agent. Pathogenesis is thought to be a combination of hostfactors and viral replication processes (Gershon, 2010). SSPE is uncommon in the US, but it is
however higher in the rest of the world especially Asia, and is being seen more frequently in the
US after adoption of Asian children (Gutierrez et al., 2010).
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Surveillance
Case Definition
A case of measles is defined by the appearance of symptoms in conjunction with a
laboratory diagnosis. Due to the highly contagious nature of the disease, any suspected cases are
going to be treated as positive until proven otherwise. A measles case is defined either clinically
or by laboratory methods; so a laboratory confirmed case does not have to meet the clinical case
definition (Guris et al., 2004).
1. Clinical case definition
a. Any person in whom a clinician suspects measles OR
b. Any person with
i. Fever (earliest symptom), and
ii. generalized maculopapular (i.e. non-vesicular) rash and pathognomic
Koplik’s spots (beginning after two to six of preceding symptoms) for ≥
3 days, and
iii. any one of cough, coryza (i.e. runny nose) or conjunctivitis (i.e. red eyes)
(concurrent with fever)
2. Laboratory defined case
a. A positive anti-measles virus IgM by enzyme-linked immunoassay (preferred) OR,
b. A fourfold increase in IgG titer shown by two serum collection, the first as soon as
possible after rash onset, and the second 10-30 days later, both tested at the same
time with the same testing methodology AND/OR
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c. A positive MV culture collected within three days of rash onset (six to ten days after
infection) when MV is most likely to be isolated by culture from urine,
nasopharyngeal or throat swabs and/or whole heparinized blood(Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, 2012b; Gershon, 2010; Guris et al., 2004; World Health
Organization, 2009)
US Surveillance System
Measles surveillance in the US is carried out through a passive reporting, active
investigation system. The focus is to quickly identify measles cases, promptly control and
identify risk factors (Guris et al., 2004). The surveillance case definition is similar to the clinical,
but has three classes;
1. Suspected: febrile illness and rash,
2. Probable: meets clinical case definition, questionable or no laboratory confirmation
and not epidemiologically linked to a confirmed case,
3. Confirmed: either laboratory confirmed or meets clinical case definition and is
epidemiologically linked to a confirmed case.
In keeping with a passive system, follow-up is initiated by a case reported to a local
health department when a patient seeks medical aid. Reports can come from concerned parents,
patients, school or daycare employees and (rarely) airline attendants and immigration officers
(Guris et al., 2004). Figure 2 shows the reporting processes in response to a suspected measles
case and give an idea of the labor intensity (and expense) of the investigation. The Virginia
Department of Health (VDH) has deemed measles an emergent reportable disease by laboratories
and healthcare providers which has to be reported within 24 hours by the most rapid means
possible (Guris et al., 2004).
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Figure 2: Measles surveillance in the US. This illustrates the pathways and agencies involved in measles surveillance.
CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; EPO, Expanded Program on Immunization; NCID, National Center
for Infectious Diseases (Guris, Harpaz, Redd, Smith, & Papania, 2004).

The Central Shenandoah health district requires that such reports be given to an actual
person by telephone (not voicemail) and the paperwork faxed during regular operational hours.
The follow-up is standardized by use of a case investigation flowchart (Appendix A) and case
investigation worksheets.
MV cultures are routinely sent to the Measles Virus Laboratory at the CDC for gene
typing. Genetic testing verifies the elimination of endemic measles in the US. The working
definition for endemic measles is a single chain of infection lasting at least one calendar year.
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012d; Gershon, 2010; Harpaz et al., 2004). A few
genotypes in an outbreak indicate an endemic source, whereas imported infections show many
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different genotypes as has been seen in US outbreaks since elimination of endemic measles (Rota
et al., 2004)
Outbreak response
Outbreak response is coordinated by the local health department; they conduct follow up
investigations with all contacts of the index case(s) and verify vaccination documentation using
the case investigation flowchart (Appendix A) and case investigation worksheets. If there is a
large enough exposure, they will educate the communities involved on measles infection, signs
and symptoms. Messages are sent by electronic-mail and fax to local healthcare providers. All
unvaccinated persons and those with unverified vaccination state should receive vaccine (most
effective within 72 hours of exposure) or IG (most effective within 6 days of exposure) from their
health care provider or the health department. Contacts with whom vaccine is contraindicated
(e.g. pregnant women, infants younger than 12 months, AIDS patients and other immune
compromised people) will receive IG. IG should not be used to control outbreaks because it
provides temporary protection and does not prevent subsequent outbreaks. (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, 2012b; Guris et al., 2004; Strebel et al., 2004; World Health
Organization, 2009).
Measles Vaccine
The current vaccine strain used in the US is the Edmonston B derived Moraten strain.
The vaccine is distributed as a freeze dried powder to be reconstituted with sterile water. Inactive
ingredients include human albumin, neomycin, sorbitol and gelatin. It is available as a MeaslesMumps-Rubella (MMR) or a Measles-Rubella (MR VAX) combination vaccine (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, 2012b; Strebel et al., 2004).
Immune response to the measles vaccine is similar to that of natural infection. There is an
initial spike in IgA, IgM and IgG. Only the IgG antibody persists. Titers decrease over time, but
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increase on challenge by either wild-type or vaccine MV (Strebel et al., 2004). Serologic testing
in studies and current epidemiological data shows that though antibody titers fall and are lower
post-vaccination compared to natural infection, they are still high enough to provide the
necessary, lifelong protection (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012b; Strebel et al.,
2004).
Maternal antibodies inactivate vaccine virus before it has a chance to cause an immune
response so the vaccination age is a balance between the earliest age for seroconversion and the
age of greatest risk of infection. These values change with geographic location, mother’s immune
status and transplacental transfer efficiency. The age of immunization in the US has changed over
the years from as early as nine months to as late as 15 months of age. The current
recommendation is between 12 and 15 months of age for children born to immunocompetent
mothers. Children born to HIV infected mothers should be vaccinated before 12 months of age.
Adult onset HIV patients do not lose their measles immunity, but this is not the case with
children. If measles vaccine or infection occurs after HIV infection their immunity wanes and
they do not always respond well to repeat vaccination (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2012b; Strebel et al., 2004). The WHO recommendation is 9 months of age in
developing countries due to higher risk of infection (Strebel et al., 2004) which should be
considered when traveling with infants.
Primary vaccine failure with one dose occurs in 2-5% of recipients. This is usually due to
passive antibody persistence (if infants) or vaccine handled inappropriately (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, 2012b). Newer vaccines are more stable at a wider range of temperatures
(Strebel et al., 2004).
Primary vaccine failure rate for two doses is about 1%; this is part of the reasoning
behind the two dose recommendation – this way 99% of vaccinated people are immune. (Centers
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for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012b). The other is because anamnestic response increases
the baseline antibody titer. Retrospective review of a spike in measles cases between 1989 and
1991 showed highest incidence in children younger than five years old and many of them
younger than the recommended age (12 to 15 months) to receive MMR. These infants were also
born to mothers who were immunized as children, it was postulated they did not have enough
maternal antibody and so the two dose MMR vaccine program was initiated (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, 2012b).
US Vaccination rates
Figure 3 shows the US measles vaccination rates beginning in 1967. There are no data
available between 1985 and 1991 because no surveys were carried out by the CDC (Black, 2012).
According to the chart, the 2010 rate is 91.5%. Though these are high rates, they are coupled with
increasing incidence of measles at a population level and at community levels (Seward &
Orenstein, 2012). Herd immunity is protection non-vaccinated people gain from being part of a
highly vaccinated society. Herd immunity reduces incidence risk hence the risk of an otherwise
susceptible person acquiring an infection. The herd immunity threshold (HIT) for measles is 83-

Figure 3: US vaccination trends. Chart shows two-dose MMR coverage from 1967 to 2010. Data from National
Health Interview Survey (NHIS) and US Immunization Survey (USIS) (Black, 2012).
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94% (Vynnycky & White, 2010). Herd immunity threshold is used to provide a goal for
immunization programs. It is an estimate at best, for example the United Kingdom (UK) has a
vaccination rate of 89% but is in an endemic measles state (Bedford, 2011; Vynnycky & White,
2010).

Vaccine Safety
The safety of vaccines has been question by skeptics since they were first used. A cartoon
published in 1802 by James Gillray showed cows erupting from Edward Jenner’s patients.
Historically medical science has been sufficiently wrong about drugs and their side-effects to
warrant skepticism; thalidomide and Vioxx are two of many examples. In addition, new research
continually tests and at times changes ‘current’ knowledge; scientists consider this improvement
while patients would lose confidence. Vaccine safety is especially sensitive because the majority
of vaccine adverse events occur in healthy infants. In comparison, the side effects of other drugs
(such as antibiotic associated diarrhea) occur in already sick people (Chen, 1999). Demonstrated,
biologically plausible vaccine adverse events include malaise, fever, rash, thrombocytopenia,
anaphylaxis, encephalopathy, residual seizures and Guillain-Barre syndrome (Bedford, 2011;
Institute of Medicine, 1993; Strebel et al., 2004).
Figure 4 shows a plot of the variables in play over the lifetime of an immunization
program. Of key importance to this discussion are stages 3 and 4 where confidence in vaccine
decreases due to an increase in adverse events relative to disease incidence.
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Figure 4: Evolution of Immunization Programs and Prominence of Vaccine Safety. Representation of the changes
in vaccine coverage relative to adverse event rate and vaccine preventable disease rate (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, 2003a; Chen, 1999).

Thompson and Duintjer Tebbensc proposed a negative feedback loop describing
wavering commitment to vaccine programs due to cost (2008). The same mechanism can be
applied to the outbreak between stages 3 and 4 in Figure 4 and is depicted in Figure 5. Blue
arrows (causal links) connect a variable that causes a change in another. A plus sign at the
arrowhead shows a change in the same direction, either an increase causes another increase or a
decrease causes a decrease. A minus sign indicates an inverse relationship, an increase causing a
decrease and vice versa. In Figure 5 an increase in measles incidence increases risk of infection to
all susceptible individuals. As people around them are infected, the non-vaccinated for fear of the
adverse effects of vaccine will likely tend to be more willing to vaccinate if they weight the
likelihood of infection against the likelihood of a vaccine reaction. The ensuing increase in
willingness to vaccinate increased the vaccinated fraction of the population which reduces the
disease incidence. This is an example of a balancing feedback loop. Figure 5 describes what is
currently occurring in the US and UK. Stratton et al said in an Institute of Medicine (IOM)
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Figure 5: A balancing feedback loop describing changing perception of vaccination risk with disease incidence
and the subsequent effect on vaccination rate. Adapted from Thompson and Duintjer Tebbens (2008)

report, “Ironically, the successes of vaccine coverage in the US have made it more diffcult for the
public to weigh the benefits and complications of vaccines because the now-controlled dieases
and their often-serious risks are no longer familiar” (2001). The lack of proximity to measles
infection has led some parents to focus instead on adverse events (Schwartz, 2012; Shim,
Grefenstette, Albert, Cakouros, & Burke, 2012) and refuse vaccination for their children.
The Lancet published a paper in 1998 in which Andrew Wakefield reported 8 children
(out of a group of 12) showed autism symptoms (developmental regression) and gastrointestinal
problems beginning after receipt of MMR (Brown et al., 2012; Institute of Medicine, 2001; A. J.
Wakefield et al., 1998; A.J. Wakefield, 1998). Though the paper states the need for more
evidence, it caused wide reaching MMR mis-trust. It received a lot of media and celebrity
attention highlighting the danger of MMR vaccine. After further investigation and an absence of
reproducible evidence the paper was retracted in 2011, an incident that was not as publicized. The
paper is still the starting point of many anti-vaccine debates. Many different studies have been
conducted showing no link between MMR and autism (Brown et al., 2012; Fitzpatrick, 2004;
Hornig et al., 2008; Institute of Medicine, 2001). Of note is a paper by Gerber and Offit (2009)
which reviews thirteen published studies with different designs, publication dates and locations.
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All the studies do not support an association between MMR and austism. They go on to tackle
two other vaccine-linked autism hypotheses: thimerosal and too many vaccines(Yapko, 2003).
Gerber and Offit (2009) also show no association based on seven studies. The UK Department of
Health, WHO, the American Academy of Pediatrics and IOM seperately released statements in
2001 all saying there were no data to support Wakefield’s claims (Institute of Medicine, 2001).
Observed increase in autism incidence could be due to increasing awareness and a diagnostic
definition that casts a wider net than before (Gerber & Offit, 2009; Yapko, 2003).
The 1993 and 2001 Institute of Medicine vaccine safety reports have concluded the
following:


There still is a limited understanding of the pathophysiology of vaccine adverse events



Adverse events data are usually sourced from incomplete case reports and cannot always
be verified



There is limited follow up (by epidemiologic studies)



Surveillance systems(Appendix B) are not able to show evidence of causation because
there are few experimental studies relative to all studies published on the topic; many
adverse events have demonstrated biologic plausibility but there is indeterminate or no
data from controlled studies to test hypotheses



There are no incidence rates calculable from adverse events reports, the best metric is a
reporting rate to which there is no comparison against events due to chance
A summary of the findings of the Institute of Medicine’s 1993 report on measles

containing vaccines, Adverse Events Associated with Childhood Vaccines: Evidence Bearing on
Casuality is provided in Appendix C. The decision to vaccinate is a balance between risk of
infection, risk of adverse event and benefits of vaccine. Once vaccinated it is prudent for parents
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and physicians to monitor patients specifically for adverse events, with the understanding that not
all events following vaccination are caused by the vaccine. This practice would make better data
available in adverse event surveillance systems so better decisions can be made and safer
vaccines created.
Opposition to vaccination is no longer a local, grassroots movement. Ready and
widespread internet access gives critics a medium through which to speak to whole nations with
no regard of their credentials. Online forums, blogs and websites are the source of information for
many parents averse to vaccination (Insel, 2012; Schwartz, 2012). Though internet also gives
ready access to reputable peer-reviewed sources, the peer-review process is not perfect and most
people search for corroboration, not necessarily correction or balanced views.
Virginia Cases
Seven measles cases were reported in Virginia during 2011 (Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, 2012c). Only three were indigenous (patients acquired the infection within the
US). Three of the seven cases occurred in Charlottesville, this study will focus on this cluster
because it is the only one for which documentation was available. A woman infected while
travelling abroad exposed two children without direct contact; the children came into a room after
she departed while she was infectious. The children then attended school and visited several local
businesses while they were infectious. Once informed, the Thomas Jefferson Health District
(TJHD) branch of the VDH began an investigation. They determined the need for public
awareness and two IG/vaccination clinics which were set up with assistance from VDH staff from
other health districts; all this was done in less than 18 hours. Over the following two days, 200
people were evaluated (Virginia Department of Health, 2011). This case exemplifies local health
departments’ non-pharmaceutical (education) and pharmaceutical interventions to infectious
disease emergencies.
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Social Impact
The documented public health event reported above exemplifies the potential for
widespread social disruption. The primary factor is that patients are infectious for four days
before symptom onset. When symptoms start they will seem like cold symptoms and many
patients may go about their daily activities convinced of a common cold. The following
observations assess the impact of a sustained chain of infection.
Education
While infectious and lacking symptoms, children with measles have access to many
potentially susceptible children at school or day-care. The contact rate varies with class size and
activities, but contact encompasses events like riding the bus, assembly, dining hall, gym and
extra-curricular activities indoors. The infectiousness of MV and its longevity in the air (two
hours) makes it conceivable to have infectious contact with 30 to 100 (or more) students and
staff.
Vaccine rates vary between public and private schools. In Virginia, during the 2010-2011
school year 93% and 86% of kindergarteners had two-dose MMR vaccine in public and private
school respectively. In both public and private middle schools, rates were above 95% (Sommer &
Farrell, 2011). If vaccine rates were to trend downwards, the most aggressive spread of infection
would most likely occur in the school-going population. Outbreaks are most often seen where
there are pockets of susceptible individuals (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2005;
Moss & Griffin, 2012). This puts private school students, staff and families at higher risk because
they show lower vaccination rates in Virginia.
Industry
If school-aged children comprise the largest base of susceptible persons, a sustained
infection chain will disrupt working adults as they will tend to their infected children. This will
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lead to many missed work days and widespread disruption of industry and local economy.
Sustained low or decreasing vaccination rates without an outbreak will reduce herd immunity so
that a late occurring outbreak would infect both children and adults. According to the CDC’s
National Immunization Survey and the immunization Services Division, adult vaccine rates are
best estimated from available (historical) school immunizations (Black, 2012).
Healthcare providers
Thirty to forty percent of measles patients have complications. Otitis media, diarrhea and
pneumonia are the most common (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012b; Moss &
Griffin, 2012). In 2011 thirty percent of all infections reported in the US were hospitalized
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2011a). A sustained infection chain would impact
healthcare providers by increasing census with patients who are resource intensive and by
reducing available staff.
Measles patients require negative air isolation rooms which ensure infectious particles are
exhausted outside the facility. Once the patient leaves, the room should not be used for at least
two hours (Remley, 2011). All healthcare workers caring for patients require an N95 respirator
which can only be used after individual fitting and education by a trained occupational health
professional. Treating measles patients is thus material resource and physical plant intensive. In
addition, healthcare providing facilities could easily be understaffed if some staff has to be home
caring for their own infected children, family members or if they are sick.
Financial cost
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The costs due to measles (before vaccine licensing) in 1963 are estimated to range from
$1.4 billion (M. B. Oldstone, 2000) to $3.4 billion (Strebel et al., 2004) in direct healthcare costs2.
A 2011 study estimated cost of measles cases seen in Japan between 1999 and 2003 at US$ 404
million. In contrast, vaccination of all the infected patients would have cost US$165 million.
These values include direct healthcare cost and indirect costs such as working days lost
(Takahashi et al., 2011). Another study estimated the cost of one measles case in the US between
$18,000 and $28,000 in healthcare and public health resources. In comparison the cost of one
dose of vaccine, excluding administrative cost ranged from only $0.92 to $18.63 (Coleman et al.,
2012).
System Dynamics Methodology
Introduction to System Dynamics
System dynamics (SD) is a method of analyzing and modeling interactions in complex systems.
An event oriented world view would depict a simple system with variable A causing B which
causes C (Figure 6). These variables are assumed to change in isolation and are analyzed as such.
In contrast, SD analyses system behavior as a product of system structure which includes any
feedback between dynamically changing system characteristics as shown in Figure 6.

A

B

C

Event oriented world view

A

B

System oriented world view

Figure 6: Event oriented and system oriented world views.

2

C

Values are adjusted for inflation to 2010 dollar value using The Inflation Calculator at
http://www.westegg.com/inflation/
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Characteristics of Complex Systems (John. D. Sterman, 2000)
Dynamic
Complex systems are in a constant state of change. Many ‘static’ systems when viewed
on a long enough time scale will show change (John. D. Sterman, 2000). Gaining and losing of
herd immunity is one such process, it is a slow and long change. This model’s dynamics arise
from the inclusion of births, deaths and aging. For example, in the UK endemic measles
transmission was halted in 1994. MMR rates started to decline in 1998; it was 2006 until the first
measles outbreaks began. By 2008 measles was declared endemic and a public health response
initiated (Bedford, 2011; Editorial team, 2008). Looking at problems on a long time scale allows
the analyst to see unintended consequences, effects of time delays and system inertia – in short it
gives a clearer picture of the scope and full behavior of the system. This use of long time scales
gives SD methodology a high-level view of systems or problems; high enough to detect action in
the system without necessarily seeing the individuals behind the action (Milstein, 2008).
Tightly coupled
Tightly coupled systems are characterized by a widespread ripple effect, changing one
variable while the others are static is near impossible. SD modeling assists analysis of tightly
coupled systems by providing a visual result of all (selected) downstream changes so the analyst
can see the extent of the ripple. Controlling an infectious disease has biological, social and
economic elements. This thesis will focus on the biological and slightly on the social, but the full
effects of an outbreak are far reaching. SD methodology allows multi-disciplinary analysis. The
model presented here could be extended to include study topics such as vaccination decision
making processes, analysis of the social and/or financial impact among others.
Feedback
In a tightly coupled system a reaction will influence the next action (John. D. Sterman,
2000). As discussed in the section on Vaccine Safety, there is balancing feedback between
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incidence of disease and vaccination rates (Chen, 1999) which leads to a wavering of
commitment to vaccinate children. An example of reinforcing feedback in this system occurs in
an outbreak. The presence of more infected people increases the rate of infection which results in
larger infected populations. These and other feedback cycles are characteristic of this system.
Nonlinear and Counterintuitive
Another characteristic of complex systems is nonlinearity of change. The size of a change
in a system depends on feedback dominance in that moment. Though an outbreak is driven by
competing reinforcing and balancing feedback dynamics, the instantaneous changes in system
state depend on which of those dynamics are currently dominating. Such interactions cause the
nonlinear and counterintuitive behavior of complex systems such that the most obvious policy
changes do not always provide the greatest leverage (John. D. Sterman, 2000). Though
vaccination rates are high in the US, there has been a definite increase in measles incidence and it
is not immediately clear why this is so (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2011a,
2012a).
Policy Resistance
SD methodology also accounts for the potential of unintended consequences and policy
resistance. Both these terms refer to how complex systems often adapt to changes or
interventions, thereby yielding outcomes that can sometimes befuddle policymakers. These
outcomes can dilute, delay or entirely defeat the policy. An example is the increased use of
antibiotics (policy) which has fueled (in part) the increased prevalence of multidrug resistant
bacteria. Low nicotine and/or low tar cigarettes increase consumption by smokers as they try to
get the level of nicotine they are accustomed to (John D. Sterman, 2006). The high efficacy of
anti-retroviral treatments for HIV/AIDS have increased quality of life for patients, but increases
risky behavior thereby increasing infection rate and resistant strains (Rice, Batterham, &
Rotheram-Borus, 2006). As discussed in the Vaccine Safety section is the decreased confidence
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in vaccines stemming from the public’s ignorance of the reality of measles morbidity and
mortality borne from the success of the vaccine.
Organized immunization resistance groups began with the passing of vaccination acts in
Europe and America in the 19th century. Anti-vaccination groups saw these laws as a breach of
civil liberty. Groups thrived even in countries where vaccination was not required by government
(Wolfe & Sharp, 2002).

System Dynamics Application
SD was born as a business analysis tool but has been applied to many fields including
medicine, epidemiology and public health (J. B. Homer & Hirsch, 2006a, 2006b; J. Homer,
Hirsch, & Milstein, 2007; Milstein, 2008; Milstein, Homer, & Hirsch, 2010; Milstein et al., 2007;
John. D. Sterman, 2000; Trochim, Cabrera, Milstein, Gallagher, & Leischow, 2006). It is a
beneficial tool because in spite of the exact and rigorous nature of most medical research science,
disease occurs in an uncontrolled environment and is dependent on people’s behavior and other
host factors. SD analysis is precise enough to match the science yet can also account for
behaviors and decisions that may lack strict measurements by using curve fitting and regression
methods (J. B. Homer & Hirsch, 2006b).
SD and mathematical modeling is useful to analyze and better understand system
interactions by creating a simplified mock-up of a real system. Models thus contain simplifying
assumptions chosen so that they do not interfere greatly with system structure and behavior
(Choisy, J.-F., & Rohani, 2007; Sattenspiel, 2002; John. D. Sterman, 2002). A model therefore
allows the testing of ideas and theories that may be dangerous, unethical, expensive or otherwise
prohibitive in experimental execution. And as mentioned earlier, complex systems have time
delays and action dilutions that make real-time experimentation infeasible for present causefuture effect analysis. For these reasons there is no study in which subjects are denied vaccine to
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see the size and duration of resulting outbreaks. Modeling allows extensive analysis of such
scenarios affordably, with no harm to people and in a few minutes.

CHAPTER 2: SEIR-AGING CHAIN MEASLES MODEL
Model Purpose
This chapter outlines the model used for this thesis. It is a population-based, deterministic
model in continuous time (Anderson & May, 2004; Vynnycky & White, 2010) built using
STELLA©, version 9.1.4. The purpose of the model is to explore conditions under which an
imaginary population might experience endemic measles, given that a small fraction of newborns
are either not inoculated (due to parental preferences or inaccessibility to appropriate care), or are
inoculated but still susceptible (due to the limitations in the effectiveness of the vaccine). Under
such conditions, the susceptible fraction of the population will increase over time to a point that,
given the introduction of an index case, epidemic conditions could be realized. The goal is to
determine the conditions under which this could happen. The types of conditions considered are
vaccination fraction (proportion of the population that is vaccinated) and susceptible fraction
(proportion of the population that is not immune to measles).
Since measles is a childhood disease, there are many studies focused on children. Disease
and population dynamics differ with age so this model goes beyond childhood to analyze the long
term effects of childhood vaccine exemption. In order to accomplish these goals, the model is
designed to mimic an imaginary population that starts with 100,000 people, in four different age
cohorts as shown in Figure 7. The initial population is distributed in proportions consistent with
US census values for 2010. The model only allows for changes to population size through births
and deaths (i.e. no migration into or out of the population). The cohorts are populated with
equilibrium starting values and people age down the structure.
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Figure 7: Age cohorts

Modeling terminology
Figure 8 shows the icons used in the model developed for this thesis. The terminology is
also defined.

Figure 8: Modeling icons and terms



Stocks are rectangles in which materials, in this case people, accumulate. They
represent ‘states’ through which people pass, or might reside for extended
periods of time. At any point in the simulation, the numeric value of a stock
indicates the number of people in that particular state.



Sources or sinks (represented by the cloud icons) initiate or terminate a flow into
or out of a stock. Since the dynamics creating these sources or sinks are not
specified, they represent what is beyond the model boundary. In the current
context, stocks are used to represent categories or states that individuals in the
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population can occupy (such as “infected individuals” or “recovered
individuals”)


Flows are double-lined arrows with that fill or drain stocks at a rate dependent on
the level of the stock and the time spent in the stock (wait time). In the model
described in this thesis, the flows will represent rates at which people transition
from one state to the next (from “susceptible” to “infected,” for example)



Auxiliary variables can depend on other parts of the system and hence vary over
time (i.e. endogenous variables), or they can be fixed values set by the user (i.e.
exogenous variables). They often represent properties or characteristics of the
phenomenon under study. They help to regulate the behavior of the system.
Examples of auxiliary variables in our model are characteristics of the disease,
such as its infectivity and the duration of infection, etc.



Causal links are red arrows which show that one element affects another
according to a mathematical formula.
The SEIR Backbone

The natural history of measles determines the model structure; within each cohort a
Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Recovered model structure (Britten, 2009; Vynnycky & White,
2010) is used to mimic and track the progression of the disease, assuming contact between
infected and susceptible individuals occurs across age cohorts, as well as within each cohort (total
mixing).

Figure 9: Basic SEIR structure
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The basic SEIR structure is extended in this model to account for birth, death,
immunization and immunization omission (by exemption, oversight or lack of access to care).
This extended SEIR structure is shown in Figure 10.

Figure 10: Extended SEIR structure

The model seeks to explore measles disease dynamics using the aging chain (age
cohorts). The SEIR structure is embedded within each cohort. For example the SEIR structure for
the pre-school age cohort is shown in Figure 10. The acronym MACSEIR (“Mac-seer”) is the
model name, where MACSEIR stands for “Measles Age Cohort SEIR”. An overview of the
aging chain with the embedded SEIR structures is shown in Figure 11.
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Figure 11: Full MACSEIR structure
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Assumptions
This model assumes all newborns carry maternal antibodies for an average of seven
months (Strebel et al., 2004). In reality this only applies to babies born to immune mothers
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012b; Strebel et al., 2004). After the seven month
wait time newborns flow into a susceptible state (Immunization omission rate in Figure 11) or
they can be immunized by vaccination (Immunization rate in Figure 11).
The model assumes all immunization occurs in the pre-school cohort (green panel in
Figure 11) and immunity gained from vaccine is permanent. Ongoing studies show sustained
vaccination immunity up to 33 years in immunocompetent people (Dine et al., 2004). Some
immune compromised people can lose immunity which makes measles prevention problematic in
areas with high HIV prevalence for example (Griffin, Moss, & Cutts, 1999; Helfand et al., 2005;
Nair et al., 2009). The model also assumes full (two dose) immunization hence the use of 99% for
vaccine efficacy (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012b).
The infected population in each age cohort in Figure 11 is disaggregated into
asymptomatic and symptomatic stocks to account for three to five day period during which
people are infectious without symptoms (Heffernan & Keeling, 2008). It is during this period that
most exposures occur as people go about their activities of daily living, once symptomatic they
succumb to the infection and self-quarantine until they are fully recovered. There is no outbreak
intervention in the model apart from this self-quarantine. This leads to an overestimation of
outbreak size.
The model also assumes total mixing which allows infection to spread beyond cohort
borders (Figure 11). Some cohorts have higher contact rates, thus higher chances of infectioncausing contact. Infection rate equations are cohort specific; inter-cohort spread arises from
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incorporation of total symptomatic infected and total asymptomatic infected population
proportions used in place of the term (I/N) in the equation used by Sterman:
(

)

(

)( )

c = contact rate,
i = infectivity,
S = Susceptible,
I = Infectious
N = Total population (John. D. Sterman, 2000).
This equation is modified in the model so that

(

)( )

(

)( )

the first term refers solely to asymptomatic infected people and the second refers to symptomatic
infected. These terms inherently account for the reduction of the reproductive number (R0) seen
in immunized populations (Plans Rubió, 2012).
Model Age Cohorts
Age cohort in the MACSEIR structure allows the simulation of a scenario in which a
susceptible working adult is infected abroad, returns home and infects susceptible children who
then infect class mates and/or play mates. This capability is not often considered in measles
models.
Pre School Cohort
The pre-school sector contains newborns up to four year olds. The stock and flow
structure is shown in Figure 12. Daily Birth Rate is calculated from an annual birth rate per
woman of childbearing age. After seven months they leave the Newborns stock. The majority of
them will receive their vaccine after an average of 28 days (Brown et al., 2012; Orenstein,
Rodewald, & Hinman, 2004) and flow through Immunization rate into the Immunized stock. The
second fraction flows through Immunization omission rate. These children are not vaccinated
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intentionally (because their parents claim vaccination exemption) or unintentionally (because they
fall through the cracks of vaccination programs). These two groups will age without immunity,
become infected and recover or die in this sector. National exemption rates ranged from <0.1% to
7.0% (median = 1.5%) and Virginia reported 1.0% among kindergarteners in the 2011-2012
school year (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012e). Though all children entering
schools should show proof of vaccination or exemption some children are inadvertently missed
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2003b). Kindergarten surveys for Virginia report
93% MMR vaccination rate and 1% exemption rate leaving 6% of kindergarteners in this flow
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012e). Greby at the CDC defines this value as
children “whose records were not updated by the time the school vaccination reports were due”
(2013). Britten suggests these children have fallen through the cracks of the immunization
program (2009). Another cause of this discrepancy could be lack of access to primary care.
Whatever the cause is, they are assumed to be susceptible and their proportion is calculated in the
model by adding the vaccination fraction and exemption fraction and subtracting that from one.
These children will age without immunity, become infected and recover or die in this sector. This
model assumes all vaccination occurs in the pre-school age group. In reality people can be
immunized at any time. The majority of people are immunized for school entry which is why
immunization data is extracted from school admission data (Black, 2012).

Figure 12: Stock and flow structure of the Pre School sector
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The length of stay in the pre-school sector is four years. Earlier versions of the model
over-estimated immunized fraction because this long delay. Earlier model versions had two preschool susceptible flows (designated PSc Sw Awaiting MMR and PSc Sn Never Immunized) that
aged out every four years. From the stock of children awaiting immunization a fraction (PSc
Vaccinated fraction) was immunized every 28 days. The remnant of this stock was to account for
the missed vaccinations, but it proved inaccurate. The longer the model ran the immunized
fraction approached 92% regardless of the user-input value (vaccination fraction). This problem
was solved by using first order delays with similar wait times instead of a second order delay with
vastly different wait times. All the children who would not be vaccinated went into one stock of
never immunized children and those awaiting immunization in their own stock.
Based on surveillance from 2001 to 2010, 30% of imported associated cases of measles
were among travelers aged 6-23 months (Kaye, 2011). This cohort is highly likely to produce an
index case because of travel with parents. Historically, transmission in this group most often
occurs in day-care and health-care settings (Yip, Papania, & Redd, 2004).
School age cohort
The school age sector (Figure 13) contains the 5 to 24 year olds. The age bounds of this sector
were decided upon in part by the availability of census data. This group has the highest contact
rate and so the majority of infections. Between 1993 and 2001, 46% of all cases where in the 5 to

Figure 13: Stock and flow structure of the School age cohort
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18 year age group and occurred in school (Yip et al., 2004). The wait time in this sector is 13
years. The immunized and recovered remain in their stocks and age or die. The susceptible could
age into susceptible adulthood, be infected or die in this sector.
Working adult cohort
The working adult sector contains 35 to 64 years olds. This group has the second largest
contact rate because of work and family activities. A portion of this group could be especially
vulnerable due to occupational exposure – hospital, clinic, emergency services, teaching and
child-care staff. If susceptible parents have an infected child, they will likely be infected while
caring for the child before they have access to appropriate personal protective equipment.
This cohort’s structure is identical to the school age cohort, and like the school age
cohort, the majority of the working adult population will be either immunized or recovered
because the incidence of childhood diseases decreases as people age (Anderson & May, 2004;
Vynnycky & White, 2010). They will remain in their stocks and age into the next sector or die.
Working adult susceptible people can be infected, age into the next cohort or die. According to
available documents (Virginia Department of Health, 2011; Yip et al., 2004) this cohort is highly
likely to travel abroad hence to produce an index case.
Retired adult cohort
This sector contains people older than 65. Since this is the last sector, the population tends to this
sector in long runs. The risk of infection in this group will be smallest and the chances of an
outbreak originating here are small, but still possible. Its structure is identical to the school age
and working adult sectors.
Model output
The model provides plots of numerous values that can be used to evaluate the evolution
of the population over time and the time-varying response to index measles cases (i.e. whether an
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outbreak occurs, and also to determine at what point the population loses its herd immunity).
Some of these values will be described here.
Susceptible Fraction
This value calculates the proportion of the total population that is susceptible to measles
infection. It is the quotient of all susceptible stocks and the total population. Susceptible fraction
increases were population increases without a concurrent increase in vaccinated fraction. In the
presence of an index case an outbreak occurs when susceptible fraction surpasses a threshold
value (Britten, 2009; Wallinga, Heijne, & Kretzschmar, 2005).
Fraction Immune
This value calculates the proportion of the population that is resistant to measles
secondary to infection or vaccination. This population provides herd immunity, so the higher it is,
the smaller the force of infection in the presence of an index case.
Fraction Immunized
This value is the proportion of the population that is resistant to measles secondary to
vaccination alone.
Interface
STELLA allows a customizable control interface for ease of adjusting model parameters.
Part of the MACSIER interface is shown in Figure 14. The first column contains immunization
and cohort specific disease switches to control those model features. This allows easy transition
from the baseline (no immunization) to the vaccination rate testing scenarios. These switches also
allow the model to be run for disease in one cohort while the rest of the model runs as a
population analysis tool. The next two columns contain slider inputs for vaccination fraction,
exemption fraction and cohort specific number of index cases and index frequency. At the bottom
of these two columns are the pulse start and birth rate sliders and below those the start and stop
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buttons. Initial population values are externally calculated and entered into a table input tool. The
rest of the interface contains graphic output tools. In the event that this tool is used in a seminar
setting, these interface features can be customized to the intended use.

Figure 14: MACSEIR Interface

CHAPTER 3: MODEL TESTING
A model is a simplified, representation of reality useful to assist our understanding of the
system it represents. According to John. D. Sterman (2002) all models are wrong, but if they are
to be useful they have to mimic reality to a sufficient degree to guide decision making. Following
Sterman (2000) this chapter describes the testing performed on the MACSEIR model.
Evaluation of Structural Validity
This tests how well the model’s stock and flow structure, causal connections, and overall
logic are consistent with what is known about the underlying system. The model was presented to
members of the thesis committee whose expertise covers system dynamics modeling, virology
and epidemiology. It was also presented to two state health department epidemiologists and
adjusted in accordance to their recommendations.
Dimensional consistency
This ensures units in the model’s equations are dimensionally consistent. During the
model building process and after completion dimensional consistency was tested using a tool
built into the STELLA® software.
Evaluation of Extreme Conditions and Behavior Anomalies
This test ensures the model produces plausible results when given extreme variables.
Behavior anomaly tests the model’s ability to attain and sustain equilibrium. Birth, aging,
immunization and disease are controlled by switches inserted for testing the model which
behaved as expected when these were switched off before and in the middle of runs. The birth
rate switch ensured no births and the population decreased to extinction on long enough runs.
Aging switches responded by the population accumulating in the oldest age sector available. Both
these tests attest to the structural and logical integrity of the aging chain structure.
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User-input values were subjected to extreme value testing. The salient problem that arose
was the persistence and recurrence of infection due to fractional infectious population as shown in
Figure 15. In between the peaks, infected populations were less than one but greater than zero and
without a new index case these fractions added up to cause a new outbreak. This was countered
by emptying any stock carrying infectious people whenever it fell below one.

Figure 15: Accumulation of fractional infectious population.

Though initial population distribution is consistent with fractions calculated from 2010
census data, these proportions are not maintained at the end of a run; age cohort sizes change
based on the length of time of analysis. Total population equilibrium is difficult to attain because
of varied wait times in each cohort. Using the birth rate range available on the interface allows
runs in which population increases or decreases.
Initial immunized population is calculated by an external spreadsheet and entered by the
user. With enough time the model reaches these target vaccine fractions if a run is initiated in
disequilibrium.
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Test for Integration errors
This assessment tests for any change in results if integration method or if integration time
step is changed. The model shows consistent results with either and both changes. It is set to run
in Euler’s integration with a time step that varies with the length of run time desired by the user.
Behavior reproduction
This test compares the model’s results to results in the real system, other models and also
tests if different runs produce the same results. Figure 16 shows the change in the population
distributions when one infected individual is introduced in a totally susceptible population of
100,000. Each curve in Figure 16 has its own scale, indicated by the colored numbers on the left
axis that correspond to the color of the line. The graph shows expected results.
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Figure 16: Index case in an unimmunized population. Run time = 120 days.

Because measles is episodic in the United States the results of this test will be based on
the model’s ability to predict a herd immunity vaccination threshold. This will be discussed in
chapter 4.

CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS
Run Parameters and Values
These auxiliary variables listed in Table 1 are standard for all model runs. The model’s
run time is set to 18250 days (50 years). Initial population is 100,000 people.
Table 1
Model parameters

Name

Full Name

Source

Value

Veff

Vaccine efficacy

0.99

infectivity

Infectivity

(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
2012b)
(Anderson & May, 2004; John. D. Sterman,
2000; Vynnycky & White, 2010)

Ts

Serial interval

12 days

Ta

Asymptomatic
Interval
Symptomatic interval

(Anderson & May, 2004; Vynnycky & White,
2010)
(Heffernan & Keeling, 2008)
(Heffernan & Keeling, 2008)

4 days

Infected fractional
death rate
Pulse start

(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
2012b)
User

1 per 365 days

Vaccinated fraction

User

Varies

Never immunized
fraction
Annual Birth rate

User

Varies, 0.015
Varies,

Asymptomatic
contact rate
Index cases

Calculated from 64.1 births per 1,000 woman of
childbearing age per year (Hamilton, Martin, &
Ventura, 2012)
Calculated, (Hoyert & Xu, 2012; US Census
Bureau, 2012)
10 (pre-school), 15 (school age), 12 (working
adult), 8 (Retired adult)
User (cohort specific)

Index frequency

User (cohort specific)

730 days

Td
I f DR
pulse start
Vacc
fraction
Never Imm
fraction
Annual BR

Death rate

0.9

4 days

350 days

Varies by
cohort
Varies by
cohort
1 person

Experimental Scenarios
Baseline
The baseline runs consisted of a single index case introduced to an unvaccinated
population. The primary outbreak ran for 176 days and peaked with 34,805 cases. Subsequent (or
secondary) outbreaks occurred every 4 years or with every other index case. They ran for a range
of 218-238 days and showed a peak infected population range of 1,670-2,138 cases. Secondary
outbreaks occurred when the susceptible fraction rose beyond 0.08. Without immunization, the
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MACSEIR shows no outbreak running beyond a year. Outbreaks are larger and tend to run longer
in the later years of the runs.
Threshold testing runs
Vaccination rate and vaccination fraction are used interchangeably to refer to the userinput level of immunization for the population. Immunization rate and immunized fraction refer
to the model calculated values.
Increasing Vaccination rate
This run was set up with a constant exemption rate. The model was set to pause every
five years at which the vaccination rate was increased by 0.02 so that over 50 years the
vaccination rate increased from 0.80 to 0.99. There were three outbreaks altogether (green peaks
in Figure 17) whose characteristics are shown in Table 2. Susceptible fraction threshold before
each outbreak was 0.04. As expected, increasing vaccination rates were associated with decreases
in frequency and size of outbreaks. Though increasing, the immunized fraction lags below the

Figure 17: Population fractions with increasing vaccination rate
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user-input value (vaccination rate) so that the final immunized fraction is 0.87 (vaccination rate =
0.99). Immunized fraction gains 0.07 points in the run; this is an example of delay and dilution of
effort inherent in the system. Even though the vaccinated fraction is raised, the system continues
to receive newborns and the exemptions force the immunized fraction down.
Table 2
Characteristics of outbreaks with increasing vaccination fraction

Year of
outbreak
1
13
29
Baseline

Length of
outbreak (days)

Time between
outbreaks (years)

Peak
Infected

Fraction
immunized

167

n/a

5786

0.80

298

12

499

0.81

334

14

444

0.82

176-238

4

34,085

0.00

Static Vaccination rate
Static vaccination rate runs were set up with the same model parameters except that the
vaccination rate remained the same for the 50 year run time. Characteristics of primary and
secondary peaks were recorded. Experimental vaccination fractions used are shown in Table 3.
Results analyzed are length of outbreak, time between outbreaks and peak number of people
infected in the outbreak.
Table 3
Vaccination fractions used in static runs

Vaccination
rate
0.99
0.96
0.94
0.915
0.89
0.83
0.80
0

Reason for selection
High value
Corresponds to model’s susceptible fraction threshold
Herd immunity threshold (HIT) upper limit (Vynnycky & White, 2010)
2010 US value (Black, 2012)
2011 UK value (2003-2004) (Bedford, 2011)
HIT lower limit (Vynnycky & White, 2010)
Lowest UK value (2003-2004) (Bedford, 2011)
Low (baseline) value
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Length of outbreak. There is no endemic transmission in any of the scenarios. Figure 18
shows the graphical results. Primary outbreaks are more dependent on vaccination rate than
secondary outbreaks since they occur early in the run. The larger the vaccine-exempt population,
the faster the outbreak grows and dies out. At 0.96 vaccination fraction the primary outbreak was
the longest. Based on the peak infected data, it was a small outbreak which allowed slower spread
of the infection contrasted to the explosive growth seen in other runs.
There are secondary outbreaks at all vaccination fractions except 0.96 and 0.99. The
longest outbreaks were 346 days (secondary outbreaks with vaccination fraction = 0.94 and 0.89).
Secondary outbreaks ran longer than most primary outbreaks. The length of secondary outbreaks
seems more dependent on the susceptible fraction than it is on vaccination rate alone. As in the
prior run, the susceptible fraction threshold is 0.04.

Figure 18: Length of outbreak for static vaccination rate

Time between subsequent outbreaks. There is no secondary transmission at 0.96 and 0.99
vaccination rate as shown in Figure 20. As expected the lower the vaccination rate, the shorter the
time between outbreaks - the susceptible fraction threshold is attained quicker because exemption
rate is higher.

47

Figure 20: Time between secondary outbreaks for static vaccination rate

Peak infected. As expected, the lower vaccination rates show higher primary infection
spikes, but all secondary outbreaks peak between 300 and 500 cases, the effect of vaccination rate
is not apparent (Figure 19).

Figure 19: Peak infected for static vaccination rate

Decreasing Vaccination rate
This run’s setup is similar to the run with increasing vaccination fraction. In this instance
the vaccination rate is decreased in a stepwise manner from 0.99 to 0.80. There were two
outbreaks (green peaks in Figure 21) whose characteristics are shown in Error! Reference
source not found.. Susceptible fraction threshold was 0.04 in both outbreaks. As expected,
increasing vaccination rate decreases frequency and size of outbreaks. Immunized fraction does
not fall as quickly as the input value (vaccination fraction) but falls faster than it rose in first run
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(Increasing vaccination rate). The final immunized fraction is 0.90 (vaccinated fraction = 0.80) it loses 0.09 points from the initial value. On its own, the immunized fraction tends downwards in
response to the persistent addition vaccine exempt fraction from newborns. It is thus easier for

Figure 21: Population fractions with decreasing vaccination rate

this value to decrease.
Table 4
Characteristics of outbreaks with decreasing vaccination fraction

Year of
outbreak
31
43
Baseline

Length of
outbreak (days)

Time between
outbreaks (years)

Peak
Infected

Fraction
Immunized

314

n/a

542

0.96

338

12

525

0.93

176-238

4

34,085

0.00

Interpretation
The purpose of this study was to develop a model and simulate the vaccination conditions
under which endemic measles transmission or significant outbreaks could occur in a fictional
population with characteristics similar to US population based on census data. The model shows
that sporadic outbreaks will occur at any immunized fraction less than 0.96. This is the solid herd
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immunity value for measles in this model. The higher the immunized fraction however, the
smaller and less frequent the associated outbreaks are.

Length of outbreak
Based on the population characteristics used, the MACSEIR did not show endemic
measles transmission in any of the tests that were ran. The longest outbreaks were 346 day long
secondary outbreaks at two different vaccination fractions. This is due to the virus’ high
infectivity. It leads to an explosive outbreak that quickly moves almost all available susceptible
people into an infected state.
Time between outbreaks
All three scenarios consistently showed that time between outbreaks increased (or
outbreaks became less frequent) at higher immunized fractions. If solid herd immunity is not
attained the closer a population is to it the fewer outbreaks there will be. While there should be
concern at a measles outbreak, there is need for public health practitioners, epidemiologists and
healthcare providers to realize that it will happen as a population approaches susceptible fraction
threshold.
Peak infected
This metric has been used to measure the size of an outbreak. When model results were
presented to public health department epidemiologists these values ran higher than expected, but
were useful for scaled comparison of outbreaks. In other words, the MACSEIR is not a good tool
for predicting the numerical size of outbreaks.
The MACSEIR shows that in a single event outbreak size depends on vaccination rate,
the higher the immunized fraction the smaller the outbreak. When there are subsequent outbreaks,
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size is bound by the susceptible fraction threshold. In the model, outbreaks persisted until
susceptible fraction was less than 0.01. It can thus be concluded that outbreak size depends on the
size of the pool of susceptible people in a population which is a function of immune fraction.

Susceptible fraction
This metric became significant as the MACSEIR was run. Though the literature
emphasizes vaccination rates, it seems outbreaks are more sensitive to this value. Vaccination
rates are the proportion of the population that has received the MMR, a more accurate measure of
population resistance is the immune fraction which includes people with natural immunity. The
sum of the immune fraction and the susceptible fraction make up the entire population.
Whichever of these two is more easily acquired is a better metric than vaccination fraction. The
susceptible fraction threshold according to the MACSEIR is 0.04. The threshold value calculated
using historical data from the Netherlands by Wallinga et al (2005) is 0.043.
Implications
As long as immune fraction is less than 0.96, there will be sporadic measles outbreaks
(Wallinga et al., 2005). The higher the vaccination fraction however, the smaller the outbreaks
will be. More attention should be paid to the susceptible fraction. This will require immunologic
population surveys. Though the US vaccination rate is high, the measles outbreaks of 2011 show
a community level high susceptible fraction (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012a)
hence a need for more community focused assessment of immune status. Some communities are
built around shared ideologies such as non-vaccination (Britten, 2009; Salmon et al., 1999)
creating pockets of susceptibility. If infected these individuals could carry the infection to similar
communities causing a wide-spread infection chain.
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Studies have shown that parents make vaccine decisions based on physician input (Brown
et al., 2012; Insel, 2012; Kennedy, Basket, & Sheedy, 2011). In light of this primary care
providers should make it a point to discuss their patients’ vaccine status. Healthcare providers
need ready access to educational materials for parents that cater to the parents as individuals.
Educational material should meet the needs of the majority, but also the very educated and
scientifically aware parent (Chen, 1999) as studies show that highly educated parents are more
likely to refuse vaccination based on vaccine safety arguments (Insel, 2012). There is a niche for
parental educational material that addresses the parents who would find the idea of multiple shots
for their infant a more emotional than scientific decision (Britten, 2009). It would also be
worthwhile for healthcare providers to make themselves knowledgeable on both sides of the
vaccine safety argument so that they can have constructive debate with parents.
Rare, but high impact diseases like measles should always be included in the training of
healthcare providers so that it is identified early. In its early stages measles symptom are very
generic, providers need to be vigilant and carry a high level of suspicion based on the patient’s
medical history, travel history and vaccine status.
Vaccine exemptions are classified as medical (legal in all states), religious (legal in 48
states) and philosophical exemptions (legal in 15 states) (Feikin et al., 2000). The prevalent
reason for vaccine exemption is unfortunately fear (Brown et al., 2012; Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, 2012a; Feikin et al., 2000; Insel, 2012). In some states the exemption
process is as simple as signing an affidavit (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012a;
Salmon et al., 1999). If this process is made more involving it might sway parents who are ‘too
busy’ to vaccinate and see little risk of disease (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
2012a) and those who are not entirely convinced with regards to vaccination (Britten, 2009). If a
more extensive submission that had to be renewed were developed it might serve as a deterrent
while providing surveillance information. This data could later be used to contact exempt children
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about vaccination once they become adults and are making their own decisions. Another gap in
vaccination rate is due to lack of access to healthcare, but this is a very complex problem
deserving individual study.
Chen (1999) suggests a need for greater transparency on vaccine safety risks by
pharmaceutical companies. In light of the presence of a sector of the population that questions
vaccine safety and the consequence of exemption, it is a reasonable response by vaccine
manufacturers is to increase the standards and transparency of vaccine safety. Chen suggested a
National Transport Safety Board equivalent (1999). Since the publication of his research the CDC
has an Immunization Safety Office whose mission is to provide vaccine safety surveillance and
research (http://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/Activities/About_ISO.html). Johns Hopkins has an
Institute for Vaccine Safety that provides the same service (http://www.vaccinesafety.edu).
Further research recommendations
The MACSEIR model would be more useful for public health professionals with the
inclusion of outbreak interventions and their approximate cost. This would be useful for
education and planning.
The immunization module can be extended to every cohort since people can get
immunized at any age. This feature would be useful to depict pharmaceutical interventions by
public health departments in response to outbreaks or periodic mass vaccinations.
Analysis of disease spread by contact patterns may need a different modeling
methodology, but would provide a better picture of transmission dynamics than total mixing.
Based on their situation, some people have more potential than others to be super spreaders. A
model that explores this would be useful for community level analysis, education and prevention
efforts.
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In its current state, the MACSEIR is beneficial for educating healthcare workers and
policymakers. A game based model showing effects of an individual’s vaccine decisions on a
community would be an excellent tool to introduce public health concepts to an individual.
Though people seek community well-being, they start with their families and their children.
Vaccination decisions are a good example of the tragedy of the commons, but once people know
the big picture effect of their decisions, they are well equipped to make better decisions.
Conclusion
Though there is low incidence compared to other parts of the world, the US is still at risk
for measles outbreaks or varying size if exemption rates increase. This study sought to find
vaccination conditions for endemic measles or significant outbreaks. Sporadic outbreaks will
occur whenever the susceptible fraction is greater than, or equal to 4% of the population, and the
outbreak length, size and frequency will depend on the vaccination fraction - the higher the
vaccination rate, the better off. The decision to vaccinate will always be based on a balance of the
risk of disease, the risk of adverse events, public health and personal freedom.
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Appendix A: Measles case investigation and case classification flowchart (Guris et al., 2004)
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Appendix B: Vaccine Safety Surveillance systems
1. The Vaccine Adverse Events Reporting System (VAERS)
http://vaers.hhs.gov
2. The Vaccine Safety Datalink Project (VSD)
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/activities/vsd.html
3. Clinical Immunization Safety Assessment Centers (CISA)
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/activities/cisa.html
4. Institute of Medicine Vaccine Safety Reviews
http://www.iom.edu/Reports.aspx (keyword search: vaccine)
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Appendix C: Summary of Institute of Medicine findings on Measles vaccine and MMR
(Institute of Medicine, 1993)
Adverse Event

Case Reports,
Series and
Reporting Rate
Uncontrolled
Observational
Studies
Category 2: evidence inadequate to accept or reject causal relation
Encephalopathy –
50 to 300 per million
Demonstrated
Indeterminate
acquired brain injury
(5 to 30 per 100,000)
1 to 3.7 per million
doses
0.01 per million,
Demonstrated
Indeterminate
Sub-acute sclerosing
panencephalitis –
(1963: 0.61 per
encephalopathy secondary
million) (Gutierrez et
to inflammation with
al., 2010)
demyelination
2 reports between
1989 and 1993, 0.7
per million doses
(Centers for Disease
Control and
Prevention, 1982)
Residual seizure – seizure
0.5-2% (epilepsy)
Demonstrated
Indeterminate
within 72 hours post
vaccination and at least two
more in the next 12 months 0.15-1.53% of doses

Controlled
Observational
Studies and
Controlled
Clinical Trials

Sensorineural deafness –
deafness due to cochlea
damage
Optic neuritis – transient
or permanent damage to
one or both eyes due to
optic nerve demyelination
Transverse myelitis –
acute onset spinal cord
demyelination

Guillain-Barre syndrome
– acute onset motor
weakness and peripheral
nerve demyelination

3

Incidence Rate3

Biologic
Plausibility

Indeterminate

Indeterminate

No data

None available,
occurs in 4% of
mumps cases
2 cases reported
before 1993
5 per 100,000
(Holdeman, Nguyen,
& Tang, 2012)
12 cases reported
between 1978 and
1993
5 per million
(Agmon-Levin,
Kivity, SzyperKravitz, &
Shoenfeld, 2009)
2 cases before 1993

Theoretical only

Indeterminate
(MMR)

No data

Demonstrated

Indeterminate

No data

Demonstrated

Indeterminate

No data

1 per 100,000

Demonstrated

Indeterminate

No data

1 per 1.8 million
doses

Incidence rate = New cases/Persons at risk * multiplier
Report rate = Cases reported/Vaccine doses administered * multiplier (Varricchio et al., 2004)
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Thrombocytopenia – low
platelet count

31.9 per million
Demonstrated
Indeterminate
(usually transient
(monovalent
secondary to viral
measles)
infection)
1 per 30,000-40,000
doses (in Finland and
Sweden)
12-14 per 100,000
Theoretical only
Indeterminate
Insulin dependent
diabetes mellitus (IDDM)4 children
– insufficient or absent
1 per 250,000 doses
insulin secretion by
of mumps vaccine (in
pancreatic beta cells
the former West
Germany)
Category 4: The evidence is adequate to accept causal relation

Indeterminate
(monovalent
measles)

Anaphylaxis – allergic
reaction to components

No data

Thrombocytopenia
(MMR) – low platelet
count

Anaphylaxis (MMR) –
allergic reaction to
components
Death from vaccine strain
measles infection

4

4% (egg) (Savage,
Theoretical only
For
Matsui, Skripak, &
Wood, 2007)
5 cases in 174 million
doses
Category 5: Evidence establishes causal relation
31.9 per million
Demonstrated
For (MMR)
(usually transient
secondary to viral
infection)
1 per 30,000-40,000
doses (in Finland and
Sweden)
4% (egg) (Savage et
Theoretical only
For (MMR)
al., 2007)
5 cases in 174 million
doses
N/A
Demonstrated
For

No data

No data (MMR)

No data (MMR)

No data

Low risk, possible in
immunocompromised
persons

Pancreatitis and IDDM are well recorded following epidemic mumps (Institute of Medicine, 1993)

58
Appendix D: MACSEIR Model equations
Newborns(t) = Newborns(t - dt) + (dBR - Aging_to__Imm - Refuse_Imm__Aging_to_S Missed_Imm_aging_to_S - Neonatal__DR) * dt
INIT Newborns = 1300
INFLOWS:
dBR = Daily_Live_f_BR*(Total_Sc_of__child_bearing__age+Total_Wa_population)*BR_switch
OUTFLOWS:
Aging_to__Imm = IF PSc_Imm_switch = 1
THEN to_PSc_aging_switch*(Newborns*Vacc_fraction)/days__until_S
ELSE PSc_Imm_switch
Refuse_Imm__Aging_to_S = to_PSc_aging_switch*((Newborns*Never_Imm_fraction)/days__until_S)
Missed_Imm_aging_to_S = to_PSc_aging_switch*(Newborns*(1(Vacc_fraction+Never_Imm_fraction)))/days__until_S
Neonatal__DR = Newborns*Neonatal__mortality
PSc_aI(t) = PSc_aI(t - dt) + (PSc_becoming_infectious + PSc_Index - PSc_SoR) * dt
INIT PSc_aI = 0
INFLOWS:
PSc_becoming_infectious = If (Total__Inf<1) then (PSc_Exposed_incubating)
else
(PSc_Exposed_incubating/Ts)
PSc_Index = PULSE((PSc__index_cases*PSc__Disease_switch),pulse__start,PSc_index_freq)
OUTFLOWS:
PSc_SoR = If (Total__Inf<1)
Then (PSc_aI)
Else (PSc_aI/Ta)
PSc_Exposed_incubating(t) = PSc_Exposed_incubating(t - dt) + (PSc_'Not_yet__vaccinated'_IR +
PSc_'Never_be_vaccinated'_IR - PSc_becoming_infectious) * dt
INIT PSc_Exposed_incubating = 0
INFLOWS:
PSc_'Not_yet__vaccinated'_IR = if (Total__Inf<1) then (0)
else
((infectivity*PSc_aI_CR*PSc_Sw_Awaiting_MMR)*aI_population_proportion)+((infectivity*PSc_sI_CR
*PSc_Sw_Awaiting_MMR)*sI_population_proportion)
PSc_'Never_be_vaccinated'_IR = if(Total__Inf<1) then (0)
else
((infectivity*PSc_aI_CR*PSc_Sn_Never__Immunized)*aI_population_proportion)+((infectivity*PSc_sI_
CR*PSc_Sn_Never__Immunized)*sI_population_proportion)
OUTFLOWS:
PSc_becoming_infectious = If (Total__Inf<1) then (PSc_Exposed_incubating)
else
(PSc_Exposed_incubating/Ts)
PSc_Imm(t) = PSc_Imm(t - dt) + (PSc__Imm_R - PSc_Imm_Aging - PSc_Imm_DR) * dt
INIT PSc_Imm = 4770
INFLOWS:
PSc__Imm_R = PSc__Immunized/PSc_days__to_Imm
OUTFLOWS:
PSc_Imm_Aging = to_Sc_aging_switch*(PSc_Imm/PSc_aging_time)
PSc_Imm_DR = PSc_Imm*PSc_f_DR
PSc_R(t) = PSc_R(t - dt) + (PSc_RR - PSc_R_DR - PSc_R_Aging) * dt
INIT PSc_R = 0
INFLOWS:
PSc_RR = If (Total__Inf<1)
Then (PSc_sI)
Else (PSc_sI/Td)
OUTFLOWS:
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PSc_R_DR = PSc_R*PSc_f_DR
PSc_R_Aging = to_Sc_aging_switch*(PSc_R/PSc_aging_time)
PSc_sI(t) = PSc_sI(t - dt) + (PSc_SoR - PSc_RR - PSc_sI__DR) * dt
INIT PSc_sI = 0
INFLOWS:
PSc_SoR = If (Total__Inf<1)
Then (PSc_aI)
Else (PSc_aI/Ta)
OUTFLOWS:
PSc_RR = If (Total__Inf<1)
Then (PSc_sI)
Else (PSc_sI/Td)
PSc_sI__DR = (PSc_sI*PSc_f_DR)+(PSc_sI*I__f_DR)
PSc_Sn_Never__Immunized(t) = PSc_Sn_Never__Immunized(t - dt) + (Refuse_Imm__Aging_to_S +
Missed_Imm_aging_to_S - PSc_Sn__DR - PSc_'Never_be_vaccinated'_IR - PSc_Sn__Aging) *
dt
INIT PSc_Sn_Never__Immunized = 27
INFLOWS:
Refuse_Imm__Aging_to_S = to_PSc_aging_switch*((Newborns*Never_Imm_fraction)/days__until_S)
Missed_Imm_aging_to_S = to_PSc_aging_switch*(Newborns*(1(Vacc_fraction+Never_Imm_fraction)))/days__until_S
OUTFLOWS:
PSc_Sn__DR = PSc_Sn_Never__Immunized*PSc_f_DR
PSc_'Never_be_vaccinated'_IR = if(Total__Inf<1) then (0)
else
((infectivity*PSc_aI_CR*PSc_Sn_Never__Immunized)*aI_population_proportion)+((infectivity*PSc_sI_
CR*PSc_Sn_Never__Immunized)*sI_population_proportion)
PSc_Sn__Aging = to_Sc_aging_switch*(PSc_Sn_Never__Immunized/PSc_aging_time)
PSc_Sw_Awaiting_MMR(t) = PSc_Sw_Awaiting_MMR(t - dt) + (Aging_to__Imm - PSc__Imm_R PSc_'Not_yet__vaccinated'_IR - PSc_Sw_DR) * dt
INIT PSc_Sw_Awaiting_MMR = 503
INFLOWS:
Aging_to__Imm = IF PSc_Imm_switch = 1
THEN to_PSc_aging_switch*(Newborns*Vacc_fraction)/days__until_S
ELSE PSc_Imm_switch
OUTFLOWS:
PSc__Imm_R = PSc__Immunized/PSc_days__to_Imm
PSc_'Not_yet__vaccinated'_IR = if (Total__Inf<1) then (0)
else
((infectivity*PSc_aI_CR*PSc_Sw_Awaiting_MMR)*aI_population_proportion)+((infectivity*PSc_sI_CR
*PSc_Sw_Awaiting_MMR)*sI_population_proportion)
PSc_Sw_DR = PSc_Sw_Awaiting_MMR*PSc_f_DR
Ret_aI(t) = Ret_aI(t - dt) + (Ret_becoming_infectious + Ret_Index - Ret_SoR) * dt
INIT Ret_aI = 0
INFLOWS:
Ret_becoming_infectious = if(Total__Inf<1) then (Ret_Exposed_incubating)
else
(Ret_Exposed_incubating/Ts)
Ret_Index = PULSE((Ret_index_cases*Ret__Disease_switch),pulse__start,Ret_index_freq)
OUTFLOWS:
Ret_SoR = If (Total__Inf<1)
Then (Ret_aI)
Else (Ret_aI/Ta)
Ret_Exposed_incubating(t) = Ret_Exposed_incubating(t - dt) + (Ret_Sn_IR - Ret_becoming_infectious) *
dt
INIT Ret_Exposed_incubating = 0
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INFLOWS:
Ret_Sn_IR = if(Total__Inf<1) then (0)
else
((infectivity*Ret_aI_CR*Ret_Susceptible)*aI_population_proportion)+((infectivity*Ret_sI_CR*Ret_Susc
eptible)*sI_population_proportion)
OUTFLOWS:
Ret_becoming_infectious = if(Total__Inf<1) then (Ret_Exposed_incubating)
else
(Ret_Exposed_incubating/Ts)
Ret_Imm(t) = Ret_Imm(t - dt) + (Wa_Imm_Aging - Ret_Imm_DR) * dt
INIT Ret_Imm = 11700
INFLOWS:
Wa_Imm_Aging = to_Ret_aging_switch*(Wa_Imm/Wa_aging_time)
OUTFLOWS:
Ret_Imm_DR = Ret_Imm*Ret__f_DR
Ret_R(t) = Ret_R(t - dt) + (Ret_RR + Wa_R_Aging - Ret_R_DR) * dt
INIT Ret_R = 0
INFLOWS:
Ret_RR = IF (Total__Inf<1)
Then (Ret_sI)
Else (Ret_sI/Td)
Wa_R_Aging = to_Ret_aging_switch*(Wa_R/Wa_aging_time)
OUTFLOWS:
Ret_R_DR = Ret_R*Ret__f_DR
Ret_sI(t) = Ret_sI(t - dt) + (Ret_SoR - Ret_RR - Ret_sI__DR) * dt
INIT Ret_sI = 0
INFLOWS:
Ret_SoR = If (Total__Inf<1)
Then (Ret_aI)
Else (Ret_aI/Ta)
OUTFLOWS:
Ret_RR = IF (Total__Inf<1)
Then (Ret_sI)
Else (Ret_sI/Td)
Ret_sI__DR = (Ret_sI*Ret__f_DR)+(Ret_sI*I__f_DR)
Ret_Susceptible(t) = Ret_Susceptible(t - dt) + (Wa_Sn_Aging - Ret_Sn__DR - Ret_Sn_IR) * dt
INIT Ret_Susceptible = 1300
INFLOWS:
Wa_Sn_Aging = to_Ret_aging_switch*(Wa_Susceptible/Wa_aging_time)
OUTFLOWS:
Ret_Sn__DR = Ret_Susceptible*Ret__f_DR
Ret_Sn_IR = if(Total__Inf<1) then (0)
else
((infectivity*Ret_aI_CR*Ret_Susceptible)*aI_population_proportion)+((infectivity*Ret_sI_CR*Ret_Susc
eptible)*sI_population_proportion)
Sc_aI(t) = Sc_aI(t - dt) + (Sc_Index + Sc_becoming_infectious - Sc_SoR) * dt
INIT Sc_aI = 0
INFLOWS:
Sc_Index = PULSE((Sc__index_cases*Sc_Disease_switch),pulse__start,Sc_index_freq)
Sc_becoming_infectious = IF (Total__Inf<1) then (Sc_Exposed_incubating)
Else
(Sc_Exposed_incubating/Ts)
OUTFLOWS:
Sc_SoR = if (Total__Inf<1)
Then (Sc_aI)
Else (Sc_aI/Ta)
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Sc_Exposed_incubating(t) = Sc_Exposed_incubating(t - dt) + (Sc_Sn_IR - Sc_becoming_infectious) * dt
INIT Sc_Exposed_incubating = 0
INFLOWS:
Sc_Sn_IR = if(Total__Inf<1) then (0)
else
((infectivity*Sc_aI_CR*Sc_Susceptible)*aI_population_proportion)+((infectivity*Sc_sI_CR*Sc_Suscepti
ble)*sI_population_proportion)
OUTFLOWS:
Sc_becoming_infectious = IF (Total__Inf<1) then (Sc_Exposed_incubating)
Else
(Sc_Exposed_incubating/Ts)
Sc_Imm(t) = Sc_Imm(t - dt) + (PSc_Imm_Aging - Sc_Imm_DR - Sc_Imm_Aging) * dt
INIT Sc_Imm = 24660
INFLOWS:
PSc_Imm_Aging = to_Sc_aging_switch*(PSc_Imm/PSc_aging_time)
OUTFLOWS:
Sc_Imm_DR = Sc_Imm*Sc_f_DR
Sc_Imm_Aging = to_Wa_aging_switch*(Sc_Imm/Sc_aging_time)
Sc_R(t) = Sc_R(t - dt) + (Sc_RR + PSc_R_Aging - Sc_R_DR - Sc_R_Aging) * dt
INIT Sc_R = 0
INFLOWS:
Sc_RR = IF (Total__Inf<1)
Then (Sc_sI)
Else (Sc_sI/Td)
PSc_R_Aging = to_Sc_aging_switch*(PSc_R/PSc_aging_time)
OUTFLOWS:
Sc_R_DR = Sc_R*Sc_f_DR
Sc_R_Aging = to_Wa_aging_switch*(Sc_R/Sc_aging_time)
Sc_sI(t) = Sc_sI(t - dt) + (Sc_SoR - Sc_RR - Sc_sI__DR) * dt
INIT Sc_sI = 0
INFLOWS:
Sc_SoR = if (Total__Inf<1)
Then (Sc_aI)
Else (Sc_aI/Ta)
OUTFLOWS:
Sc_RR = IF (Total__Inf<1)
Then (Sc_sI)
Else (Sc_sI/Td)
Sc_sI__DR = (Sc_sI*Sc_f_DR)+(Sc_sI*I__f_DR)
Sc_Susceptible(t) = Sc_Susceptible(t - dt) + (PSc_Sn__Aging - Sc_Sn__DR - Sc_Sn_IR - Sc_Sn__Aging)
* dt
INIT Sc_Susceptible = 2740
INFLOWS:
PSc_Sn__Aging = to_Sc_aging_switch*(PSc_Sn_Never__Immunized/PSc_aging_time)
OUTFLOWS:
Sc_Sn__DR = Sc_Susceptible*Sc_f_DR
Sc_Sn_IR = if(Total__Inf<1) then (0)
else
((infectivity*Sc_aI_CR*Sc_Susceptible)*aI_population_proportion)+((infectivity*Sc_sI_CR*Sc_Suscepti
ble)*sI_population_proportion)
Sc_Sn__Aging = to_Wa_aging_switch*(Sc_Susceptible/Sc_aging_time)
Wa_aI(t) = Wa_aI(t - dt) + (Wa_becoming_infectious + Wa_Index - Wa_SoR) * dt
INIT Wa_aI = 0
INFLOWS:
Wa_becoming_infectious = if(Total__Inf<1) then (Wa_Exposed_incubating)
else
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(Wa_Exposed_incubating/Ts)
Wa_Index = PULSE((Wa__index_cases*Wa__Disease_switch),pulse__start,Wa_index_freq)
OUTFLOWS:
Wa_SoR = if (Total__Inf<1)
Then (Wa_aI)
Else (Wa_aI/Ta)
Wa_Exposed_incubating(t) = Wa_Exposed_incubating(t - dt) + (Wa_Sn_IR - Wa_becoming_infectious) *
dt
INIT Wa_Exposed_incubating = 0
INFLOWS:
Wa_Sn_IR = if(Total__Inf<1) then (0)
else
((infectivity*Wa_aI_CR*Wa_Susceptible)*aI_population_proportion)+((infectivity*Wa_sI_CR*Wa_Susc
eptible)*sI_population_proportion)
OUTFLOWS:
Wa_becoming_infectious = if(Total__Inf<1) then (Wa_Exposed_incubating)
else
(Wa_Exposed_incubating/Ts)
Wa_Imm(t) = Wa_Imm(t - dt) + (Sc_Imm_Aging - Wa_Imm_Aging - Wa_Imm_DR) * dt
INIT Wa_Imm = 47700
INFLOWS:
Sc_Imm_Aging = to_Wa_aging_switch*(Sc_Imm/Sc_aging_time)
OUTFLOWS:
Wa_Imm_Aging = to_Ret_aging_switch*(Wa_Imm/Wa_aging_time)
Wa_Imm_DR = Wa_Imm*Wa_f_DR
Wa_R(t) = Wa_R(t - dt) + (Wa_RR + Sc_R_Aging - Wa_R_DR - Wa_R_Aging) * dt
INIT Wa_R = 0
INFLOWS:
Wa_RR = if (Total__Inf<1)
Then (Wa_sI)
Else (Wa_sI/Td)
Sc_R_Aging = to_Wa_aging_switch*(Sc_R/Sc_aging_time)
OUTFLOWS:
Wa_R_DR = Wa_R*Wa_f_DR
Wa_R_Aging = to_Ret_aging_switch*(Wa_R/Wa_aging_time)
Wa_sI(t) = Wa_sI(t - dt) + (Wa_SoR - Wa_RR - Wa_sI__DR) * dt
INIT Wa_sI = 0
INFLOWS:
Wa_SoR = if (Total__Inf<1)
Then (Wa_aI)
Else (Wa_aI/Ta)
OUTFLOWS:
Wa_RR = if (Total__Inf<1)
Then (Wa_sI)
Else (Wa_sI/Td)
Wa_sI__DR = (Wa_sI*Wa_f_DR)+(Wa_sI*I__f_DR)
Wa_Susceptible(t) = Wa_Susceptible(t - dt) + (Sc_Sn__Aging - Wa_Sn__DR - Wa_Sn_IR Wa_Sn_Aging) * dt
INIT Wa_Susceptible = 5300
INFLOWS:
Sc_Sn__Aging = to_Wa_aging_switch*(Sc_Susceptible/Sc_aging_time)
OUTFLOWS:
Wa_Sn__DR = Wa_Susceptible*Wa_f_DR
Wa_Sn_IR = if(Total__Inf<1) then (0)
else
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((infectivity*Wa_aI_CR*Wa_Susceptible)*aI_population_proportion)+((infectivity*Wa_sI_CR*Wa_Susc
eptible)*sI_population_proportion)
Wa_Sn_Aging = to_Ret_aging_switch*(Wa_Susceptible/Wa_aging_time)
aI_population_proportion = Total_aI/Total__Population
Annual_BR = 64.1
BR_switch = 1
Daily_Live_f_BR = ((Annual_BR*0.508)/1000)/365
days__until_S = 212
Fract_IMMUNE = (Total_Imm+Newborns+Total_R)/Total__Population
Fract_immunIZED = Total_Imm/(Total__Population-Newborns)
Fract_S = (Total_S-PSc_Sw_Awaiting_MMR)/(Total__Population-Newborns)
infectivity = 0.9
I__f_DR = 1/365
Neonatal__mortality = 4.18/1000/365
Never_Imm_fraction = 0.015
PSc_aging_time = 1642
PSc_aI_CR = 10
PSc_days__to_Imm = 28
PSc_f_DR = 3.920E-06
PSc_Imm_switch = 1
PSc_index_freq = 200
PSc_sI_CR = 3
PSc__Disease_switch = 0
PSc__Immunized = (PSc_Sw_Awaiting_MMR*Veff)*PSc_Imm_switch
PSc__index_cases = 0
PSc__Total_Inf = PSc_aI+PSc_sI
pulse__start = 0
Ret_aI_CR = 8
Ret_index_cases = 0
Ret_index_freq = 200
Ret_sI_CR = 3
Ret_Total_Inf = Ret_aI+Ret_sI
Ret__Disease_switch = 1
Ret__f_DR = 1.223E-04
Sc_aging_time = 4745
Sc_aI_CR = 15
Sc_childbearing_fraction = 0.515
Sc_Disease_switch = 1
Sc_f_DR = 1.127e-6
Sc_index_freq = 200
Sc_sI_CR = 3
Sc_Total_Inf = Sc_aI+Sc_sI
Sc__index_cases = 0
sI_population_proportion = Total_sI/Total__Population
Ta = 4
Td = 4
Total_aI = PSc_aI+Ret_aI+Sc_aI+Wa_aI
Total_E =
PSc_Exposed_incubating+Ret_Exposed_incubating+Sc_Exposed_incubating+Wa_Exposed_incu
bating
Total_Imm = PSc_Imm+Ret_Imm+Sc_Imm+Wa_Imm
Total_PSc_population =
PSc_aI+PSc_Exposed_incubating+PSc_Imm+PSc_R+PSc_sI+PSc_Sn_Never__Immunized+PSc_
Sw_Awaiting_MMR
Total_PSc__Susceptible = PSc_Sn_Never__Immunized+PSc_Sw_Awaiting_MMR
Total_R = PSc_R+Ret_R+Sc_R+Wa_R
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Total_Ret_population = Ret_aI+Ret_Exposed_incubating+Ret_Imm+Ret_R+Ret_sI+Ret_Susceptible
Total_S =
PSc_Sn_Never__Immunized+PSc_Sw_Awaiting_MMR+Ret_Susceptible+Sc_Susceptible+Wa_S
usceptible
Total_Sc_of__child_bearing__age = Sc_childbearing_fraction*Total_Sc_population
Total_Sc_population = Sc_aI+Sc_Exposed_incubating+Sc_Imm+Sc_R+Sc_sI+Sc_Susceptible
Total_sI = PSc_sI+Ret_sI+Sc_sI+Wa_sI
Total_Wa_population = Wa_aI+Wa_Exposed_incubating+Wa_Imm+Wa_R+Wa_sI+Wa_Susceptible
Total__Inf = Total_aI+Total_sI
Total__Population =
Newborns+Total_PSc_population+Total_Ret_population+Total_Sc_population+Total_Wa_popul
ation
to_PSc_aging_switch = 1
to_Ret_aging_switch = 1
to_Sc_aging_switch = 1
to_Wa_aging_switch = 1
Ts = 12
Vacc_fraction = 0.915
Veff = 1
Wa_aging_time = 14235
Wa_aI_CR = 12
Wa_f_DR = 1.015e-5
Wa_index_freq = 200
Wa_sI_CR = 3
Wa_Total_Inf = Wa_aI+Wa_sI
Wa__Disease_switch = 1
Wa__index_cases = 0

65
REFERENCES

Agmon-Levin, N., Kivity, S., Szyper-Kravitz, M., & Shoenfeld, Y. (2009). Transverse
myelitis and vaccines: a multi-analysis. Lupus, 18(13), 1198-1204.
Anderson, R. M., & May, R. M. (2004). Infectious Disease of Humans: Dynamics and
Control. Oxford: Oxford Science.
Bedford, H. (2011). Measles: time to address a preventable problem. PRACTICE
NURSING, 22(7), 358-361.
Benn, C. S. (2012). Combining vitamin A and vaccines: convenience or conflict? Danish
Medical Journal, 59(1), B4378-B4378.
Black, Carla. (2012, 09/17/2012). [Measles vaccination coverage].
Britten, Nicole. (2009). Measles outbreaks in the face of decreasing herd immunity: The
impact of vaccine exemptions. (Master of Public Health), Yale. (1470532)
Brown, K. F., Long, S. J., Ramsay, M., Hudson, M. J., Green, J., Vincent, C. A., . . .
Sevdalis, N. (2012). U.K. parents' decision-making about measles-mumps-rubella
(MMR) vaccine 10 years after the MMR-autism controversy: a qualitative
analysis. Vaccine, 30(10), 1855-1864. doi: 10.1016/j.vaccine.2011.12.127
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (1982). Subacute Sclerosing Panencephalitis
Surveillance -- United States. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, 31(43),
585-588.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2003a). Assuring Vaccine Safety: Basic
Course for a Complex Issue.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2003b). Vaccination Coverage Among
Children Entering School --- United States, 2002-03 School Year. MMWR:
Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Report, 52(33), 791-793.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2005). Import-Associated Measles
Outbreak – Indiana, May-June 2005. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report,
54(42), 1073-1075.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2011a). Measles — United States, 2011.
Morbidity Mortality Weekly Report, 61(15), 253-275.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2011b). Notes from the field: Measles
outbreak--Hennepin County, Minnesota, February-March 2011. MMWR:
Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Report, 60(13), 421-421.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2012a). CDC Telebriefing on Measles —
United States, 2011. Transcript. [04/19/2012].
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2012b). Epidemiology and Prevention of
Vaccine-Preventable Diseases W. Atkinson, S. Wolfe & J. Hamborsky (Eds.),
Retrieved from http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/pubs/pinkbook/meas.html
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2012c). Final 2011 Reports of Nationally
Notifiable Infectious Diseases. MMWR: Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Report,
61(32), 624-637.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2012d). Manual for the surveillance of
vaccine-preventable diseases. In S. W. Roush, L. McIntyre & L. M. Baldy (Series
Eds.), Retrieved from http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/pubs/survmanual/index.html

66

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2012e). Vaccination coverage among
children in kindergarten - United States, 2011-12 school year. MMWR: Morbidity
& Mortality Weekly Report, 61, 647-652.
Chen, Robert. T. (1999). Vaccine risks: real, perceived and unknown. Vaccine,
17(Supplement 3), S41-S46. doi: 10.1016/S0264-410X(99)00292-3
Choisy, M. , J.-F., Guégan, & Rohani, P. (2007). Mathematical Modeling of Infectious
Diseases Dynamics. In M. Tibayrenc (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Infectious Diseases:
Modern Methodologies. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons.
Coleman, M. S., Garbat-Welch, L., Burke, H., Weinberg, M., Humbaugh, K., Tindall, A.,
& Cambron, J. (2012). Direct costs of a single case of refugee-imported measles
in Kentucky. Vaccine, 30(2), 317-321. doi: 10.1016/j.vaccine.2011.10.091
Dine, M. S., Hutchins, S. S., Thomas, A., Williams, I., Bellini, W. J., & Redd, S. C.
(2004). Persistence of Vaccine-Induced Antibody to Measles 26--33 Years after
Vaccination. Journal of Infectious Diseases, 189, S123-S130.
Editorial team. (2008). Measles once again endemic in the United Kingdom. Euro
Surveillance: Bulletin Européen Sur Les Maladies Transmissibles = European
Communicable Disease Bulletin, 13(27).
Feikin, D.R., Lezotte, D.C., Hamman, R.F., Salmon, D.A., Chen, R. T., & Hoffman, R.E.
(2000). Individual and Community Risks of Measles and Pertussis Associated
with Personal Exemptions to Immunizations. JAMA: The Journal of the American
Medical Association, 284(24), 3145-3150.
Fitzpatrick, Michael. (2004). MMR and autism : what parents need to know: London ;
New York : Routledge, 2004.
Gerber, J. S., & Offit, P. A. (2009). Vaccines and Autism: A Tale of Shifting Hypotheses.
Clinical Infectious Diseases, 48(4), 456-461. doi: 10.1086/596476
Gershon, A.E. (2010). Measles Virus (Rubeola). . In G. L. Mandell, J. E. Bennett & R.
Dolin (Eds.), Mandell, Douglas, and Bennett's Principles and Practice of
Infectious Diseases. (7 ed.). Philadelphia, PA, USA: Churchill Livingstone
Elsevier.
Greby, M.S. (2013, 03/04/2013). [Measles vaccination coverage estimates].
Griffin, D. E., Moss, W. J., & Cutts, F. (1999). Implications of the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic for Control and Eradication of Measles.
Clinical Infectious Diseases, 29(1), 106-112.
Guris, D., Harpaz, R., Redd, S. B., Smith, N. J., & Papania, M. J. (2004). Measles
surveillance in the United States: an overview. The Journal Of Infectious
Diseases, 189 Suppl 1, S177-S184.
Gutierrez, J., Issacson, R. S., & Koppel, B. S. (2010). Subacute sclerosing
panencephalitis: an update. Dev Med Child Neurol, 52(10), 901-907. doi:
10.1111/j.1469-8749.2010.03717.x
Hamilton, B.E., Martin, J.A., & Ventura, S.J. (2012). Births: Preliminary data for 2011.
Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics Retrieved from
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_05.pdf.
Harpaz, R., Papania, M. J., McCauley, M. M., & Redd, S. B. (2004). Has Surveillance
Been Adequate to Detect Endemic Measles in the United States? Journal of
Infectious Diseases, 189, S191-S195.

67

Heffernan, J. M., & Keeling, M. J. (2008). An in-host model of acute infection: measles
as a case study. Theor Popul Biol, 73(1), 134-147. doi: 10.1016/j.tpb.2007.10.003
Helfand, R. F., Moss, W. J., Harpaz, R., Scott, S., & Cutts, F. (2005). Evaluating the
impact of the HIV pandemic on measles control and elimination. Bulletin of the
World Health Organization, 83(5), 329-337.
Henderson, D.A., Dunston, F. J. , Fedson, D. S., & et al. (1991). The measles epidemic:
The problems, barriers, and recommendations. JAMA: The Journal of the
American Medical Association, 266(11), 1547-1552. doi:
10.1001/jama.1991.03470110093039
Holdeman, N. R., Nguyen, T., & Tang, R. A. (2012). Demyelinating optic neuritis
presenting as a clinically isolated syndrome. Optometry - Journal of the American
Optometric Association, 83(1), 9-18. doi: 10.1016/j.optm.2011.10.010
Homer, J. B., & Hirsch, G. B. (2006a). Opportunities and demands in public health
systems. System dynamics model for public health: background and
opportunities. American Journal of Public Health, 96(3), 452-458. doi:
10.2105/AJPH.2005.062059
Homer, J. B., & Hirsch, G. B. (2006b). System Dynamics Modeling for Public Health:
Background and Opportunities. American Journal of Public Health, 96(3), 452458.
Homer, J., Hirsch, G., & Milstein, B. (2007). Chronic illness in a complex health
economy: the perils and promises of downstream and upstream reforms. System
Dynamics Review, 23(2-3), 313-343. doi: 10.1002/sdr.379
Hornig, M., Briese, T., Buie, T., Bauman, M. L., Lauwers, G., Siemetzki, U., . . . Lipkin,
W. I. (2008). Lack of Association between Measles Virus Vaccine and Autism
with Enteropathy: A Case-Control Study. PLoS ONE, 3(9), 1-8. doi:
10.1371/journal.pone.0003140
Hoyert, D.L., & Xu, J.Q. (2012). Deaths: Preliminary data for 2011. Hyattsville, MD:
National Center for Health Statistics Retrieved from
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_06.pdf.
Insel, Kimberly. (2012). Treating children whose parents refuse to have them vaccinated.
Virtual Mentor, 14(1), 17-22.
Institute of Medicine. (1993). Adverse Events Associated with Childhood Vaccines:
Evidence Bearing on Casuality (K. R. Stratton, C. J. Howe & R. B. J. Johnston
Eds.). Washington, DC, USA: Institute of Medicine,.
Institute of Medicine. (2001). Immunization Safety Review Measles-Mumps-Rubella
Vaccine and Autism (B. o. H. P. a. D. P. Immunization Safety Review Committee,
Trans. K. Stratton, A. Gable, P. Shetty & M. McCormick Eds.). Washington DC,
USA: National Academy Press.
Kaye, D (Ed). (2011). Measles Imported by Returning US Travelers Aged 6-23 Months,
2001-2011. Clinical Infectious Diseases, 52(12), 1-1. doi: 10.1093/cid/cir314
Kennedy, A., Basket, M., & Sheedy, K. (2011). Vaccine Attitudes, Concerns, and
Information Sources Reported by Parents of Young Children: Results From the
2009 HealthStyles Survey. Pediatrics, 127(S1), S92-S99. doi: 10.1542/peds.20101722N
McLean, Huong. (2012). Measles -- United States, 2011. MMWR: Morbidity & Mortality
Weekly Report, 61(15), 253-257.

68

Milstein, B. (2008). Hygeia's Constellation: Navigating health futures in a dynamic and
democratic world: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Milstein, B., Homer, J., & Hirsch, G. (2010). Analyzing national health reform strategies
with a dynamic simulation model. Am J Public Health, 100(5), 811-819. doi:
10.2105/AJPH.2009.174490
Milstein, B., Jones, A., Homer, J. B., Murphy, D., Essien, J., & Seville, D. (2007).
Charting plausible futures for diabetes prevalence in the United States: a role for
system dynamics simulation modeling. Preventing Chronic Disease, 4(3), A52A52.
Moss, W. J., & Griffin, D. E. (2012). Measles. The Lancet, 379(9811), 153-164. doi:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(10)62352-5
Nair, N., Moss, W. J., Scott, S., Mugala, N., Ndhlovu, Z. M., Lilo, K., . . . Griffin, D. E.
(2009). HIV-1 Infection in Zambian Children Impairs the Development and
Avidity Maturation of Measles Virus-Specific Immunoglobulin G after
Vaccination and Infection. Journal of Infectious Diseases, 200(7), 1031-1038.
doi: 10.1086/605648
Noyce, R. S., & Richardson, C. D. (2012). Nectin 4 is the epithelial cell receptor for
measles virus. Trends in microbiology, 20(9), 429-439.
Oldstone, M. (2000). Viruses, Plagues and History. Cary, NC, USA: Oxford University
Press.
Oldstone, M.B. (2000). Viruses, Plagues, and History. Cary, NC, USA: Oxford
University Press, USA.
Orenstein, W. A., Rodewald, L.E., & Hinman, A.R. (2004). Immunization in the United
States. In S. A. Plotkin & W. A. Orenstein (Eds.), Vaccines (4 ed., pp. 13571386). Philadelphia: Elsevier.
Plans Rubió, P. (2012). Is the basic reproductive number (R 0) for measles viruses
observed in recent outbreaks lower than in the pre-vaccination era?
Eurosurveillance, 17(31).
Remley, K. (2011, 05/27/2011). [Clinicians' Letter - Measles].
Rice, E., Batterham, P., & Rotheram-Borus, M. J. (2006). Unprotected sex among youth
living with HIV before and after the advent of highly active antiretroviral therapy.
Perspectives on Sexual & Reproductive Health, 38(3), 162-167.
Rota, P. A., Rota, J. S., Redd, S. B., Papania, M. J., & Bellini, W. J. (2004). Genetic
analysis of measles viruses isolated in the United States between 1989 and 2001:
Absence of an endemic genotype since 1994. The Journal Of Infectious Diseases,
189 Suppl 1, S160-S164.
Salmon, D.A. , Haber, M. , Gangarosa, E. J. , Phillips, L. , Smith, N. J. , & Chen, R. T.
(1999). Health consequences of religious and philosophical exemptions from
immunization laws: Individual and societal risk of measles. JAMA: The Journal of
the American Medical Association, 282(1), 47-53. doi: 10.1001/jama.282.1.47
Sattenspiel, Lisa. (2002). Infectious diseases in the historical archives: A modeling
approach. In D. A. Herring & A. C. Swedlund (Eds.), Human Biologists in the
Archives : Demography, Health, Nutrition and Genetics in Historical Populations
(pp. 234-265). West Nyack, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
Savage, J.H., Matsui, E.C., Skripak, J.M., & Wood, R.A. (2007). Food allergy,
anaphylaxis, dermatology, and drug allergy: The natural history of egg allergy.

69

The Journal of Allergy and Clinical Immunology, 120, 1413-1417. doi:
10.1016/j.jaci.2007.09.040
Schwartz, J. L. (2012). New Media, Old Messages: Themes in the History of Vaccine
Hesitancy and Refusal. Virtual Mentor, 14(1), 50-55.
Scott, P., Moss, W. J., Gilani, Z., & Low, N. (2011). Measles vaccination in HIV-infected
children: systematic review and meta-analysis of safety and immunogenicity.
Journal of Infectious Diseases, 204, S164-178. doi: 10.1093/infdis/jir071
Seward, J.F., & Orenstein, W.A. (2012). Editorial Commentary: A Rare Event: A
Measles Outbreak in a Population With High 2-Dose Measles Vaccine Coverage.
Clinical Infectious Diseases, 55(3), 403-405. doi: 10.1093/cid/cis445
Shim, E., Grefenstette, J. J., Albert, S. M., Cakouros, B. E., & Burke, D. S. (2012). A
game dynamic model for vaccine skeptics and vaccine believers: measles as an
example. J Theor Biol, 295, 194-203. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.11.005
Sommer, S., & Farrell, J.B. (2011, 09/07/2011). School Imminization Assessment survey
for Kindergarten and Middle school. School Vaccination Coverage Reports.
Retrieved 09/06/2011, 2012, from
http://www2.cdc.gov/nip/schoolsurv/schoolrpt1.asp?st1=322519
Sterman, John D. (2006). Learning from Evidence in a Complex World. American
Journal of Public Health, 96(3), 505. doi: 10.2105/AJPH.2005.066043
Sterman, John. D. (2000). Business dynamics: Systems thinking and modeling for a
complex world. Boston, MA, USA: Irwind McGraw-HIll.
Sterman, John. D. (2002). All models are wrong: Reflections on becoming a systems
scientist. System Dynamics Review, 18(4), 501-531.
Strebel, P.M., Papania, M.J., & Halsey, N.A. (2004). Measles Vaccine. In S. A. Plotkin &
W. A. Orenstein (Eds.), Vaccines (4th ed., pp. 389-440). Philadelphia: Elsevier.
Takahashi, K., Ohkusa, Y., & Kim, J. (2011). The economic disease burden of measles in
Japan and a benefit cost analysis of vaccination, a retrospective study. BMC
Health Services Research, 11(Suppl 1), 254-265. doi: 10.1186/1472-6963-11-254
Thompson, K. M., & Duintjer Tebbens, R. J. (2008). Using system dynamics to develop
policies that matter: global management of poliomyelitis and beyond. System
Dynamics Review (Wiley), 24(4), 433-449. doi: 10.1002/sdr.419
Trochim, W. M., Cabrera, D. A., Milstein, B., Gallagher, R. S., & Leischow, S. J. (2006).
Practical challenges of systems thinking and modeling in public health. Am J
Public Health, 96(3), 538-546. doi: 10.2105/AJPH.2005.066001
US Census Bureau. (2012). Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012 (US
Department of Commerce, Trans.) (131 ed.). Washington, DC: US Census
Bureau,.
Varricchio, F., Iskander, J., Destefano, F., Ball, R., Pless, R., Braun, M. M., & Chen, R.
T. (2004). Understanding vaccine safety information from the Vaccine Adverse
Event Reporting System. The Pediatric Infectious Disease Journal, 23(4), 287294.
Virginia Department of Health. (2011). After Action Report/Improvement Plan (T. J. H.
District, Trans.). In L. Peake (Ed.), Thomas Jefferson Health District Measles
Outbreak Investigation After Action Report/Improvement Plan. Richmond, VA:
Virginia Department of Health,.

70

Vynnycky, E. , & White, R.G. (2010). An introduction to infectious disease modelling.
New York, United States: Oxford University Press.
Wakefield, A. J., Anthony, A., Linnell, J., Dhillon, A. P., Davies, S. E., Murch, S. H., . . .
Valentine, A. (1998). Ileal-lymphoid-nodular hyperplasia, non-specific colitis,
and pervasive developmental disorder in children. Lancet, 351(9103), 637-641.
doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(97)11096-0
Wakefield, A.J. (1998). Autism, inflammatory bowel disease and MMR vaccine. Lancet,
351, 637-641.
Wallinga, J., Heijne, J. C., & Kretzschmar, M. (2005). A Measles Epidemic Threshold in
a Highly Vaccinated Population. PLoS Medicine, 2(11), 1152-1157. doi:
10.1371/journal.pmed.0020316
Wolfe, R. M., & Sharp, L. K. (2002). Anti-vaccinationists past and present. British
Medical Journal, 325, 430-432.
World Health Organization. (2009). Response to Measles outbreaks in measles mortality
reduction setting (pp. 177). Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization,.
Yapko, Diane. (2003). Understanding Autism Spectrum Disorders : Frequently Asked
Questions. Philadelphia, PA, USA: Jessica Kingsley Publishers.
Yip, F. V., Papania, M. J., & Redd, S. B. (2004). Measles Outbreak Epidemiology in the
United States, 1993--2001. Journal of Infectious Diseases, 189, S54-S60.

